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JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT 
This Appeal is from an order denying Appellant Michael Landes' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike and Granting 
Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and a subsequent 
Judgment, which pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, was determined by the district court to be final and 
from which an appeal may be taken to the Utah Supreme Court as a 
matter of right. Article VIII, Section 9, Utah Constitution and 
Section 78-2-2(3) (j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether or not the district court erred in granting 
Respondent $75,000 as damages for past rental fees when the lessee 
abandoned the premises and the district court concluded that 
Respondent had not used its best efforts to relet the premises and 
therefore had failed to mitigate its damages. 
2. Whether or not the district court erred in its conclusion 
that Respondent was entitled to $15,000 as damages to restore the 
premises when no evidence was presented at trial concerning the 
cost of restoring the premises to its pre-lease condition. 
3. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law 
in awarding Respondent its attorney's fees when no contract between 
the Respondent and Appellant nor any applicable statutory provision 
provided for such an award. 
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4. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law 
in concluding that rejection of the lease under the applicable 
provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code did not terminate 
the lease or affect the obligation of the non-bankruptcy 
guarantors. 
5. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law 
in ruling that entry of a judgment on a separate claim precludes 
a Defendant from asserting defenses in a subsequent lawsuit 
involving a different claim because of the application of the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
6« Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law 
in ruling that entry of a judgment in a prior action precludes a 
Defendant from asserting defenses that were not raised or fully and 
fairly adjudicated in the prior case because of the application of 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 
7. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law 
in concluding that satisfaction of a judgment which did not 
adjudicate all the claims against all parties in the action 
rendered that judgment final for purposes of the application of the 
documents of res judicata and collateral estoppel, 
8. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law 
in concluding that by involuntarily satisfying a judgment which did 
not adjudicate all the claims against all parties in an action the 
Judgment Debtor gave up his right to appeal that judgment. 
9. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of law 
in ruling that Defendant was a guarantor of the obligation of Bagel 
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Nosh Holding Corp. when the only writing presented as evidence of 
such a relationship contained express conditions precedent which 
had not been fulfilled. 
10. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of 
law in ruling that Appellant owed Respondent for lease payments 
under the First Amended Lease after Respondent had terminated the 
lease by serving a notice to pay rent or quit pursuant to the Utah 
unlawful detainer statute. 
11. Whether or not the district court erred in considering 
a hearsay affidavit filed by Respondent following the trial which 
addressed a material issue raised at trial. 
12. Whether or not the district court erred as a matter of 
law in denying Appellant's Motion to Strike uncertified Exhibits 
submitted in support of Respondent's Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Section 78-36-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
See Addendum. 
11 USC Section 365(d)(4). See Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Respondent initiated the present civil proceeding against 
Appellant to enforce an alleged guaranty contract entered into 
between the parties relating to a commercial lease. The present 
action was filed by Respondent against Appellant and a co-guarantor 
ACY/ms 3 
on November 18, 1985. The parties brought cross motions for 
summary judgment before the district court. The district court 
granted Respondent partial summary judgment based on the 
application of the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res 
judicata o A trial of the remaining issues was held on December 9, 
and 10, 1988. Following the trial, on May 26, 1989, the district 
court entered a final judgment against Appellant for the total sum 
of $134,649.51. That award consisted of $75,000 for past due 
rental fees, $15,000 for renovation expenses, and $44,639.51 for 
interest, costs and attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
1. Under a Lease Agreement dated December 29, 1978 
(hereinafter referred to as "Lease"), Respondent leased to Bagel 
Nosh Holding Corp., (hereinafter referred to as "Lessee"), certain 
real property located in Olympus Hills Mall, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(Exhibit 2-P) 
2. On July 15, 1981, Respondent, Lessee, Appellant and Sidney 
Seftel executed a document entitled First Amendment to Lease which 
provided that upon the occurrence of four express conditions the 
prior default of Lessee under the Lease would be cured and the 
lease agreement as amended by the First Amendment to Lease would 
be in full force. (Exhibit 3-P) 
3. Specifically, paragraph 9 of the document entitled First 
Amendment to Lease provided that the default of Lessee would be 
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cured and the Amended Lease would be in full force and affect - "as 
of the date of the last to occur" - of the following events: (1) 
pay to the owner the sum of $7,500.00 in cash; (2) execute the 
First Amended Lease Agreement; (3) cause to be signed by Seftel and 
Landes a Guarantee of Lease attached to the Amended Lease as 
Exhibit "C"; and (4) sign and deliver to owner a promissory note 
in the principal sum of $11,000.00. (Exhibit 3-P). The third of 
these conditions precedent to the effectiveness of the Amended 
Lease, to wit, the execution by Seftel and Appellant of the 
Guarantee of Lease has never occurred. (Rec. p. 725). 
4. On July 10, 1984, Respondent caused to be served upon 
Lessee a three day notice to pay rent or vacate. (Rec. pgs. 595-
596). Said notice was served upon Lessee in accordance with the 
requirements of Utah's unlawful detainer statute, Section 78-36-1, 
et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. By failing to pay 
the past due amount or vacate the premises, Lessee was in unlawful 
detainer of the premises following July 14, 1984. (Rec. pgs. 672-
673). 
5. On July 23, 1984, Respondent filed a complaint for 
unlawful detainer against Lessee, Appellant and Sidney Seftel in 
the Third District Court for the State of Utah under Civil No. 
C84-4355. (Rec. pgs. 576-580). By said complaint, Respondent 
sought possession of the leased premises, damages for past due rent 
and treble damages as provided by the Utah unlawful detainer 
statute. (Rec. pgs. 579-580). 
6. Following the filing of its unlawful detainer complaint 
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in Civil No. C84-4355, the Respondent filed a possession bond and 
gave notice to defendants pursuant to Section 78-36-8.5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. (Rec. pgs. 672-673). Following a 
hearing on the issue of possession the Honorable Homer Wilkinson 
entered an order on November 9, 1984, requiring defendants restore 
Respondent to possession of the premises or file a $20,000 
counterbond on or before 5:00 p.m., Friday, November 9, 1984. 
(Rec. pgs. 672-673). The order went on to state that if the 
counterbond was not filed a Writ of Restitution would immediately 
issue and the defendants were required to vacate the premises 
before November 14, 1984. (Rec. pgs. 672-673). No counterbond was 
obtained or filed by defendants. 
7. On November 8, 1984, Bagel Nosh Intermountain Ltd., 
(hereinafter Debtor) filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code. (Rec. pgs. 134-136). Following 
that filing, counsel for defendants withdrew from Civil No. C84-
4355e On December 31, 1984, Respondent entered into a stipulation 
with the Debtor regarding payment of past due and ongoing rents and 
the assumption or rejection of the lease. (Exhibit K-D). The 
lease was subsequently rejected by the Debtor and operation of the 
United State Bankruptcy Code. (Rec. pgs. 134-136; and 138). 
8. On December 20, 1984, Civil No. C84-4355 came on for trial 
before the Honorable Homer Wilkinson. (Rec. p. 351). Respondent 
was present at trial and represented by counsel. Defendants were 
neither present nor represented by counsel at said trial. (Rec. 
p. 351) . At the time of the trial, Respondent chose to proceed 
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only against the individual defendants. (Rec. p. 351). In the 
absence of the defendants or their counsel, the district court 
entered judgment against the individual defendants and in favor of 
Respondent for damages in the amount of past due rents and 
associated costs and attorney's fees. (Rec. pgs. 353-354). In 
addition, the trial court found that Sidney Seftel and Appellant 
had agreed to personally guaranty performance and payment by the 
tenant under the terms of the First Amendment Lease and concluded 
that reduction to judgment of the past due, unpaid sums did not 
terminate that lease. (Rec. pgs. 353-354). Civil No. C84-4355 
remains an open case in the Third District Court for the State of 
Utah. 
9. Following entry of judgment against Appellant in Civil 
No. C84-4355, Respondent undertook extensive collection activities. 
In response to and as a result of those collection activities, the 
parties entered into a stipulation regarding payment of the 
judgment amount which was not covered by the Respondent's 
stipulation with the Debtor. (Rec. pgs. 185-188). On October 31, 
1985, counsel for Respondent filed a Satisfaction of Judgment in 
the Third District Court in Civil No. C84-4355. 
10. On November 18, 1985, Respondent filed the instant suit 
against Appellant for rental fees and costs which had accrued 
against Debtor, under the First Amended Lease during the pendency 
of the bankruptcy. (Rec. pgs. 2-52). In its complaint, Respondent 
alleged that Appellant was estopped from denying his liability as 
guarantor by application of the doctrines of collateral estoppel 
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and res judicata. (Rec. p. 4). 
11. On September 8, 1988, Appellant filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (Rec. pgs. 366-367). In that motion, he argued 
that summary judgment dismissing Respondent's complaint was 
appropriate because of the existence of several, dispositive 
defenses to liability that were not barred by the application of 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Respondent 
filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment based on its position 
that Appellant could not contest liability because of the 
application of those doctrines. (Res. pgs. 120-121). 
12. On January 20, 1989, the district court entered its 
Memorandum Decision. (Rec. pgs. 685-688). The district court 
reasoned that satisfaction of the prior judgment rendered it final 
for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel and that by 
satisfying the judgment Appellant gave up his right to appeal. The 
district court concluded that satisfaction of the judgment in the 
prior action precluded Appellant from asserting any defenses 
relating to his liability as a guarantor or the validity of the 
lease because those defenses were barred by the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. Previously on November 14, 1988, 
the district court had entered an order denying Appellant's motions 
and granting Respondent partial summary judgment. (Rec. pgs. 645-
646). 
13. On February 9 and 10, 1989, a trial was held on the 
remaining issues. (Rec. p. 629). On March 31, 1989, the district 
court entered its Memorandum Decision (Rec. pgs. 724-729) and on 
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May 26, 1989 entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment in which it granted Respondent a judgment in the total 
amount of $134,639.51 against Appellant. (Rec. pgs. 749-754). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Argument One: The district court concluded that Respondent 
did not use its best efforts to relet the premises and thereby 
failed to mitigate its damages. Under the standard found in Reid 
v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 
1989), Respondent's failure to mitigate forecloses any award of 
damages against Appellant for past due rents. 
Argument Two: The contract of guaranty which formed the basis 
of Appellant's liability contained no provision for an award of 
attorney's fees. The Lease did not expressly grant Respondent a 
right to attorney's fees in an action brought against a guarantor. 
Therefore the district court's award of attorney's fees to 
Respondent constitutes reversible error. 
Argument Three: There was no basis in the evidence presented 
at trial for the district court's award of $15,000 as damages for 
Appellant's failure to restore the leasehold premises to its pre-
lease condition. 
Argument Four: The provisions of Section 365(d)(4) of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code resulted in the automatic rejection 
and termination of the Lease. Damages resulting from termination 
are expressly defined in the Lease and the evidence presented at 
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trial established that Respondent suffered no damages as a result 
of the termination. 
Argument Five: Because the claim presented in this action 
differs from that presented in the prior case, the doctrine of res 
•judicata should not have been applied to bar Appellant from 
presenting his defenses to the Respondent's claims. 
Argument Six: The issues of fact which were litigated in the 
prior case and those presented in this case differ. Because of 
the absence of the defendants or their counsel and Respondent's 
amendments of its cause of action at the prior trial, the original 
case was not fully, fairly and competently litigated. Therefore, 
the district court's reliance on collateral estoppel to bar 
Appellant from presenting any defenses constitutes reversible 
error. 
Argument Seven: Because the prior adjudication did not 
adjudicate the Respondent's claims against a bankrupt defendant, 
the judgment entered therein was not final and could not form the 
basis for applying the doctrines of res judicata or collateral 
estoppel. 
Argument Eight: The district court ruled that satisfaction 
of the prior judgment rendered it final and therefore formed the 
basis for application of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The 
Utah Supreme Court has previously held that a judgment must be 
final and appealable before those doctrines can be imposed. 
Argument Nine: The First Amendment to Lease allegedly formed 
the basis of Appellant's liability as a guarantor. That contract 
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contained four express conditions precedent to its enforceability• 
One of those conditions, to wit, the execution of a separate 
guaranty agreement was never fulfilled• Therefore, the first 
amendment to lease was not enforceable. 
Argument Ten: The Respondent terminated the lease in question 
by serving a notice to quit or pay rent on the Lessee pursuant to 
the Utah unlawful detainer statute. This termination of the lease 
relieved Appellant from any continuing liability for rental 
payments. 
Argument Eleven: The involuntary satisfaction of the prior 
judgment did not result in a waiver of Appellant's right to appeal 
that j udgment. 
Argument Twelve: Following the trial and the close of 
Respondent's case, counsel for Respondent filed a hearsay affidavit 
in which another member of the Utah State Bar explained what a 
local Bankruptcy Judge allegedly told him regarding a critical 
legal issue in this case. The district court erroneously 
considered this prejudicial affidavit in reaching its decision. 
Argument Thirteen: Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment was not supported by affidavit but by uncertified copies 
of certain documents. The district court erroneously denied 
Appellant's Motion to Strike those exhibits and considered them in 
granting Respondent's motion. 
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ARGUMENT ONE 
THE RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO MITIGATE RENDERS THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES REVERSIBLE ERROR 
In Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 110 Utah Adv. 
Rep 12 (Utah 1989), this Court imposed a duty upon landlords to 
mitigate their damages by reletting the premises after a tenant 
vacates or defaults on the covenant to pay rent. In Reid this 
Court held: 
"[T]hat a Landlord who seeks to hold a breaching tenant 
liable for unpaid rents has an obligation to take commercially 
reasonable steps to mitigate its losses, which ordinarily 
means that the Landlord must seek to relet the premises." Id. 
110 Utah Ad. Rep. 17. 
This Court went on to explain that under this standard of 
objective, commercial reasonableness, a landlord has the burden of 
proving the fact that it took positive steps reasonably calculated 
to effect a reletting of the premises. Ld. 110 Utah Ad. Rep 17. 
At the trial of the present case, Appellant argued that 
Respondent had failed to fulfill its duty of mitigation and 
therefore was foreclosed from receiving an award of damages for 
past due rents. Although the Reid decision had not been released 
at the time of trial, Appellant based this mitigation defense on 
the statutory provisions of Section 78-36-12.6, Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953), as amended. At trial, Appellant argued that 
because the lessee had abandoned the premises, Section 78-36-12.6 
imposed an affirmative obligation upon the landlord to mitigate by 
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reletting.1 
Based upon the undisputed evidence presented at trial, the 
district court concluded that the Respondent did not use its best 
efforts to relet the premises. (Rec. p. 727). This conclusion was 
based in part on the testimony of David Pugh who was the property 
manager for Olympus Hills Mall. Mr. Pugh testified that as many 
as thirty (30) potential tenants were interested in leasing the 
space in question following the Lessee's abandonment. (Trans, p. 
142). In addition, Mr. Pugh testified that the premises could have 
been leased within three months of October, 1985. (Trans, p. 147). 
These potential tenants were refused by the Respondent because 
it made a subjective determination that it would only relet the 
premises to a certain kind of tenant. (Trans, p. 119). As Mr. 
Pugh explained, the Respondent informed the property manager that 
it would only rent the premises to prime tenants that were strong 
financial operations and had recognized names. (Trans, p. 141). 
The testimony before the district court and the record on 
appeal establishes conclusively that the Respondent made a 
subjective decision to leave the property idle when it could have 
been leased. Under Reid, such a subjective decision is a violation 
of a landlord's duty to mitigate. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. 
Co., 110 Utah Adv. Rep. p. 16. 
At trial, the Respondent failed to prove that it fulfilled its 
xThe act of abandonment is clearly establishes by the record 
in this case. The trial court found a paragraph 12 of its 
memorandum decision that the exact date that Bagel Nosh vacated the 
premises is unknown. (Rec. p. 726). 
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obligation of mitigation. In fact, the district court concluded 
as a matter of law that the Respondent failed to use its best 
efforts to relet the premises. That conclusion and this Court's 
decision in Reid are dispositive of the present appeal. 
Therefore, the district court's award of $75,000.00 for past 
due rents constitutes reversible error and requires that the 
judgment below be reversed. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR 
From prior decisions a set of clearly defined rules regarding 
the award of attorney's fees has emerged. The first of these rules 
is that attorney's fees may not be recovered unless expressly 
provided for by contract or statute. Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 
391, 392 (utah 1984); Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304 (Utah 1979); 
Walker v. Sandwick, 548 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1976); Holland v. Brown, 
394 P.2d 77 (Utah 1964). Secondly, any award of attorney's fees 
must be based on the express terms of the contract between the 
parties. See Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976). See also, 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667, 671 
(Utah 1982). 
In the present case, Respondent sought an award of attorney's 
fees against Appellant based on Section 29.06 of the Lease. At no 
time did Respondent allege or introduce any evidence to prove that 
Appellant was a party to the Lease. Rather, Respondent argued that 
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by execution of the First Amendment to Lease, Appellant enter into 
a contract of guaranty whereby he became a personal guarantor of 
the terms of the First Amended Lease. The First Amendment to Lease 
had no express provision regarding attorney's fees.2 (Exhibit 3-
Rather than relying on the actual contract which formed the 
basis of Appellant's liability, the district court granted 
Respondent attorney's fees based on the provisions of the separate 
lease agreement.3 This award constitutes reversible error for two 
reasons. In the first place, Appellant is not a party to the Lease 
and has no liability thereunder. Secondly, the express terms of 
the Lease do not provide for an award of attorney's fees in the 
present case. 
The lease originally provided for an award of attorney's fees 
in Sections 24.03 and 29.06. Section 24.03 was deleted from the 
lease by being marked through. Therefore, any grant of attorney's 
2While the Utah Supreme Court has granted an award of 
attorney's fees in a case involving a personal guarantee, the award 
was based on an express provision for payment of such fees 
contained in the guaranty agreement. North Park Bank of Commerce 
v. Nichols, 645 P.2d 620, 622 (Utah 1982). 
3It must be noted that the First Amendment to Lease stated 
that the terms of Appellant's personal guaranty would be spelled 
out in a separate Guarantee of Lease which was to be attached to 
the Lease as Exhibit "C". The Respondent failed to introduce this 
Guarantee of Lease at the trial. (Rec. p. 725) Because Respondent 
failed to introduce the document which defined the contract between 
the parties any award of attorney's fees for enforcement of that 
contract of guaranty constitutes reversible error. 
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fees under the lease must be based on Section 29.06.4 
Under the express terms of Section 29.06, the only time that 
attorney's fees could be awarded is when the Respondent initiates 
an action against the tenant. Appellant is not the tenant and has 
no liability under that Section. Therefore any award of attorney's 
fees to Respondent constitutes reversible error. 
ARGUMENT THREE 
NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS EXISTS FOR THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
AWARD OF $15,000 IN RESTORATION EXPENSES 
At the trial, Respondent sought an award of $165,000 from 
Appellant for the purpose of remodeling the premises. Respondent 
argued that this amount was necessary to create a "vanilla finish" 
to the premises which would assist the Landlord in attracting a 
national tenant. (Transcript p. 10). 
In contradiction to Respondent's position, Appellant argued 
that the terms of the Lease required the Lessee to merely restore 
the premises to its condition before the Lessee took possession. 
Respondent disagreed with Appellant's interpretation of the lease 
provisions and presented evidence of its estimate of the cost of 
producing a "vanilla finish" at the premises. (Transcript p. 129). 
4Section 29.06 states: "In the event that any time during the 
term of this lease either the Owner or the Tenant shall institute 
any action or proceeding against the other relating to the 
provisions of this lease, or any default hereunder, then, and in 
that event, the unsuccessful party in such action or proceeding 
agrees to reimburse the successful party for the reasonable 
expenses of such action including reasonable attorney's fees and 
disbursements incurred therein by the successful party." 
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At no time during the trial, did the Respondent present any 
evidence of what the condition of the premises was before the 
Lessee took possession or what the cost would be to restore the 
premises to that condition. (Transcript p. 133; pgs. 93-94). 
Respondent's only evidence went to the cost of the so called 
"vanilla finish". 
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court agreed with 
Appellant's interpretation of the Lease as it regards restoration 
of the premises and refused to award Respondent its requested cost 
of remodeling the leasehold. However, without any evidentiary 
basis , the district court assessed damages against Appellant in the 
amount of $15,000 as the cost of restoring the premises to its pre-
lease condition. This award is totally unsupported by any evidence 
and must be reversed. 
It is axiomatic that the plaintiff must prove the amount of 
damages. See Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel., 709 
P.2d 330 (Utah 1985). As this Court explained in Sawyer v. FMA 
Leasing Co. , 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986), the fact of damages 
must be proven with reasonable certainty and the amount by a 
reasonable though not necessarily precise estimate. 
In the present case, the Respondent called Roger P. Knight to 
testify as to the cost of remodeling the premises. Upon cross 
examination, Mr. Knight admitted that he did not know the condition 
of the leasehold before the Lessee took possession and could not 
testify as to the cost of restoring the premises to that condition. 
(Transcript p. 133). Similarly, the Respondent's general manager, 
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Mr. Richard Skankey, testified that he could not state what it 
would cost to restore the premises to their pre-lease condition. 
(Transcript p. 94). 
No testimony or other admissible evidence was introduced by 
Respondent at the trial on this measure of damages. Therefore, 
there is no evidentiary basis for the district court's award of 
$15,000 against Appellant and that portion of the judgment must be 
reversed. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
THE LEASE IN QUESTION WAS TERMINATED 
BY ITS AUTOMATIC REJECTION UNDER THE 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE 
In support of his motion for Summary Judgment and at the trial 
of this case, Appellant argued that the bankruptcy of the Lessee 
resulted in the rejection of the Lease, if the Lease was not 
terminated by Respondent's prior notice to quit. Appellant further 
argued that according to the majority of courts that have analyzed 
that issue, the rejection resulted in termination of the lease and 
required the district court restrict Respondent's damages to those 
provided by Section 24.02 of the Lease.5 
5Section 24.02 of the Lease (Exhibit 2-P) provides in 
pertinent part: "No such re-entry or taking possession of said 
premises by owner shall be construed as an election on its part to 
terminate this lease unless a written notice of such intention be 
given or unless the termination thereof be decreed by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. . . . Should owner at any time terminate 
this lease for any breach, in addition to any other remedies it may 
have, it may recover from Tenant all damages it may incur by reason 
of such breach, including the cost of recovering the leased 
premises, reasonable attorneys' fees, and including the worth at 
the time of such termination of the excess if any, of the amount 
of rent and charges equivalent to rent reserved in this lease for 
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The majority of time spent in the two day trial of this case 
related to this termination defense. In its Memorandum Decision, 
the district court rejected Appellant's position and concluded as 
a matter of law that the bankruptcy proceeding of Debtor did not 
result in the termination of the lease. (Rec. p. 727). This 
erroneous legal conclusion constitutes reversible error. 
On November 3, 1984, Debtor filed for relief under Chapter 11 
of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Section 365(d)(4) of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code provides that in a case under any 
chapter of that title, if the trustee (or debtor-in-possession) 
does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of non-residential 
real property under which the debtor is the lessee within 60 days 
after the date of the order for relief, then such lease is deemed 
rejected, and the trustee shall immediately surrender such non-
residential real property to the lessor. 
Assumption of a lease under Section 365 requires formal 
approval of the bankruptcy court. While the various federal courts 
are split on whether the bankruptcy court's order must be entered 
before the 60 days have run, those courts have unanimously agreed 
that a motion or other similar expression of a trustee's intent to 
the remainder of the stated term over the then reasonable rental 
value of the leased premises for the remainder of the stated term, 
all of which amounts shall be immediately due and payable from 
Tenant to Owner. In determining the rent which would be payable 
by tenant hereunder, subsequent to default, the annual rent for 
each year of the unexpired term shall be equal to the average 
annual minimum and percentage rents paid by Tenant from the 
commencement of the term to the time of default, or during the 
preceding three (3) full calendar years, whichever period is 
shorter. 
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assume must be filed with the court within that period. See In re 
By-Rite Distributing, Inc., 55 B.R. 740 (D.C. Utah 1985); See also 
In re Treat Fitness Center, Inc., 60 B.R* 878, 880 (9th Cir. BAP 
1986). 
Similarly, the federal courts have agreed that the trustee or 
debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11 case may not unilaterally 
assume a lease and the assumption of a lease can not be effected 
solely by conduct. In re Swiss Hot Dog Co. , 72 B.R. 569, 571, 573 
(D. Colo. 1987); In re Chandel Enterprises, Inc., 64 B.R. 607, 609 
(Bkrtcy. C D . Cal. 1986). 
The certified docketing sheet for the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy 
reveals that no order was ever entered by the bankruptcy court for 
the assumption of the lease in question. (Exhibit B-D). 
Therefore, the record before the district court established that 
the lease had been rejected by operation of the bankruptcy code. 
See In re Chandel Enterprises, Inc. , 644 B.R. 607, 610 (Bkrtcy. 
CD . Cal 1986). Notwithstanding when the rejection occurs, the 
fact of rejection relates back to the day before the petition was 
filed. See In re Dixie Fuels, Inc., 52 B.R. 26, 27 (Bkrtcy. N.D. 
Ala. 1985); Acme Precision Bldg. v. Dayton Forging, 23 B.R. 79, 84 
(Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1982). 
Thus, no matter when the rejection took place, upon rejection 
the rights of the parties are determined as if the lease was 
rejected the day before the petition for bankruptcy was filed. 
However, the determination that the lease was rejected marks 
the beginning rather than end of the legal question involved in the 
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present case. There is a distinct split of authority in the 
federal courts concerning the effect of such a rejection. Prior 
to the amendment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, most courts, which 
considered the issue, concluded that the rejection simply 
constituted a pre-petition breach of the lease but did not 
terminate the lease. 
Following the so-called "shopping center" amendment which was 
enacted as part of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act, the majority of courts now agree that this statutory 
rejection terminates the lease. See In re Hawaii Dimensions, Inc., 
47 B.R. 425 (D.C. Hawaii 1985); In re Hurst Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 
70 B.R. 815 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Southwest Aircraft 
Services, Inc. , 53 B.R. 805 (Bkrtcy. CD. Cal. 1985); In re Gillis, 
92 B.R. 461 (Bkrtcy. D. Hawaii 1988); In re Mead, 28 B.R. 1000 
(D.C. 1983); In re Leonetti, 28 B.R. 1003 (D.C. Pa. 1983). 
This majority position is explained in detail in In re Giles 
Associates, Ltd., 92 B.R. 695 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Tex. 1988). (A copy 
of that case is included in the appendix hereto) . In Giles, Chief 
Judge R. Glen Ayers undertook an exhaustive analysis of the 
legislative history of Section 365(d)(4) and its relation to other 
sections of the Bankruptcy Code. Based on that analysis, Chief 
Judge Ayers concluded that the express language of the bankruptcy 
code and its legislative history clearly shows that, a Section 
365(d)(4) rejection was intended by the legislature to effect a 
termination of a nonresidential lease. 
However, the district court rejected this majority position 
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and sided with the minority in concluding that the rejection of the 
lease did not result in its termination. Appellant believes that 
this legal conclusion is erroneous and if allowed to stand would 
create a questionable precedent. 
The conclusion that rejection does not operate to terminate 
the lease creates a confusing and unworkable state of affairs. As 
the court explained in Giles, Section 364(d)(4) results first in 
a rejection of the lease and next in an absolute obligation to 
surrender the premises. If the rejection is merely a breach of the 
lease, immediate surrender would not be necessary and the 
landlord's right to possession would be governed by applicable 
state law. However, under the amended code, failure to assume the 
lease within the statutory, sixty day period results in its 
automatic rejection and extinguishes any and all interest of the 
debtor in the leasehold.6 See In re Chandel Enterprises. Inc., 64 
B.R. 607, 610 (Bkrtcy. CD. Cal. 1986). 
Therefore, if the lease is not terminated by the rejection, 
an anomalous situation is created in that the debtor has lost all 
its interest in the leasehold and must surrender possession 
immediately but would still be obligated to make rental payments 
as required by the lease to the landlord. Obviously this was not 
the intent of the legislators. 
6It should be noted that assumption of the lease requires the 
debtor to cure all past defaults and provide adequate assurance of 
future performance. See 11 USC Section 365(b)(1). 
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In addition, the federal courts have defined the measure of 
damages that a landlord may claim against a debtor/lessee who has 
rejected a nonresidential lease. In such a situation, the landlord 
has an administrative claim against the estate for the rental 
amount provided under the lease during the 60 day period between 
the petition and the automatic rejection and a general unsecured 
claim for pre-petition past due rental payments. See In re TDC 
Development Corp., 73 B.R. 135, 137 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Tex. 1987). Once 
the lease is rejected, the lease rate no longer controls and the 
debtor is only required to pay the reasonable rental value of the 
premises while in possession thereof. In re Chandel Enterprises, 
Inc.. 64 B.R. at 610. 
Therefore, rejection of the lease determines the landlord's 
rights to possession and limits the landlord's right to collect 
damages against the debtor/lessee. However, under the district 
court's reasoning, the rejection of the lease, while returning 
possession to the landlord would not effect a termination of the 
lease. Under that reasoning the debtor/lessee would have no right 
to possession or use of the premises for the remainder of the lease 
term but would be required to continue to make monthly payments as 
provided by the lease. 
It appears that the district court, in the present case, may 
have been confused by the distinction between the effect of the 
rejection of the lease on the debtor/lessee and its effect on the 
liability of a guarantor of the lease. Because the guarantor is 
not the debtor in bankruptcy, the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 
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do not act directly upon his potential liability. However, 
application of the various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code may 
have an indirect affect on the measure of a guarantor's liability. 
For example, if Section 365(d)(4) effects a termination of the 
lease then the lease is terminated as to both the debtor and its 
guarantor and any recovery of damages by the landlord must be based 
on the provisions of the lease relating to termination. In this 
case those provisions are found in Section 24.02 of the lease. 
Thus, although the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy did not eliminate the 
guarantor's liability, the statutory termination of the lease 
affects the measure of damages recoverable from Appellant by the 
Respondent. 
However, at the trial, Respondent's chief witness and managing 
partner testified that the Respondent did not suffer any 
termination damages as that term is defined in the pertinent 
portions of Section 24.02. 
Specifically, Mr. Richard Skankey testified that the tenant 
had been in default on its obligation to pay rent prior to the 
rejection of the lease but those amounts had been paid before the 
present case was initiated. (Trans, p. 278). He testified that 
Respondent expended no costs to recover possession of the leasehold 
premises. (Trans, p. 80). In addition, he testified that the rent 
paid per month for the prior three years was $2,625 per month. 
(Trans, p. 281). Previously, he had testified that the fair rental 
value of the premises was $3,000.00 per month. (Trans, p. 102). 
Finally, Mr. Skankey testified that Respondent incurred no 
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attorney's fees in relation to the reletting of the leasehold 
premises. (Trans. p. 86). 
Those elements constitute the measure of damages provided by 
the express terms of the lease agreement following termination of 
the lease. As the testimony of Mr. Skankey reveals, the Respondent 
suffered no damages under that standard. 
Therefore the district court's erroneous conclusion of law 
that the lease was not terminated by the rejection greatly 
prejudiced Appellant and constitutes reversible error. 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
APPLIED UNDER THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that, while 
related, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are 
usually mutually exclusive. Schaer v. State By & Through Utah 
Dept., 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983). In Schaer, Justice Durham 
explained that where the claim, demand, or cause of action is the 
same in both cases, res judicata applies, but where the claim, 
demand or cause of action is different in the cases, then 
collateral estoppel is applicable. Id.. p. 1340. 
In the first action between the present parties, the 
Respondent sought possession of the premises, past due rental fees 
incurred prior to July 14, 1984, and statutory treble damages. The 
first action was brought under the Utah unlawful detainer statute, 
Section 78-36-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
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In the case presently before this Court, the Respondent did 
not name the tenant as a defendant, and did not initiate the action 
under the unlawful detainer statute. Instead, the Respondent 
simply sought past due and accruing rental fees from the Appellant 
and an alleged co-guarantor. The period of time involved in the 
present case was distinct and different from the period in which 
rental fees were sought in the prior action. 
Other courts have held that separate causes of action exist 
for rental or lease fees that accrue at different time. See 
Rasmussen v. Chase, 720 P.2d 860, 861 (Wash. App. 1986). In 
Mountain States, Etc. v. Salt Lake City, 596 P.2d 649 (Utah 1979), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that res judicata has no application 
in a suit involving an obligation which has accrued in a period 
subsequent to the period at issue in the original litigation. 
While the court was concerned with tax obligations in Rasmussen, 
the basic principle is equally applicable to obligations accruing 
under a commercial lease. 
If the claims, demands or causes of action were the same in 
the two proceedings, then correct application of the doctrine of 
res judicata or claim preclusion would bar the Respondent from 
bringing the present action. See Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch 
Corp.. Inc., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah 1983). As Justice Stewart 
explained in Church; 
The law is that a claim once litigated cannot be relitigated 
in a subsequent case between the same parties or their 
privies. Id, 1048. 
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In the present case, the trial court committed manifest error 
in concluding as a matter of law that the claims were different and 
allowed Respondent to proceed with the case but invoked the bar 
provided by application of res judicata to all of Appellant's 
defenses. 
If this Court concludes that the two claims are the same and 
that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable, following its 
decision in Church, it must dismiss the Respondent's cause of 
action in its entirety. If this Court concludes that the claims 
are separate and distinct then, based on its decision in Schaer 
and the long line of cases following that case, it must hold that 
the trial court committed error in applying the doctrine of res 
judicata to bar the litigation of Appellant's defenses to 
liability. 
ARGUMENT SIX 
THE DOCTRINE OF rOT.T.ATBttAL ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN INVOKED BY THE TRIAL COURT TO BAR APPELLANT 
FROM PRESENTING ISSUES OF FACT THAT WERE NOT 
ACTUALLY LITIGATED IN THE PRIOR ACTION 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the 
relitigation of issues that have been once litigated and determined 
in another action even though the claims for relief in the two 
actions may be different. Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 
P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). As Justice Stewart explained in 
Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983): 
Collateral estoppel is a branch of what was once lumped with 
other rules under the general doctrine of res judicata. 
Collateral estoppel is distinct from the rules of bar and 
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merger - other branches of res judicata - in that it precludes 
relitigation only of issues actually tried in a prior action, 
and it may be invoked even through the subsequent cause of 
action is different from the former. 
In further defining the doctrine of collateral estoppel, this 
Court has explained that the doctrine does not apply to issues that 
merely could have been tried in the prior cause but operates only 
on issues of fact which were actually asserted and tried in that 
case. Schaer v. State By & Through Utah Dept., 657 P.2d at 1341. 
In direct contradiction to this established rule of law, in 
the present case, the trial court ruled that application of the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, barred the 
Appellant from presenting any and all defenses that he did or could 
have raised in the prior action. Based on this erroneous legal 
conclusion, the trial court granted Respondent partial summary 
judgment against Appellant on all issues except the amount of 
damages. This overly broad application of collateral estoppel 
contradicts established decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and 
constitutes manifest error. 
In Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978), this 
Court set forth the four tests which determine the applicability 
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Those tests are: (1) was 
the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one 
presented in the action in question; (2) was there a final judgment 
on the merits; (3) was the party against whom the plea is asserted 
a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and 
(4) was the issue in the first case competently, fully, and fairly 
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litigated. See also Schaer v. State By & Through Utah Dept., 657 
P.2d at 1340, 1341. 
This four test standard has been affirmed and applied several 
times by this Court and the Utah Court of Appeals. See Baxter v. 
Dept. of Transp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 1985), Trimble Real 
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 457 (Utah App. 1988), Cooper 
State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah App. 1987); 
See also Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 
1981). 
In order to impose the bar presented by the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel a court must find that each of the four tests 
are fulfilled. As Justice Howe explained in Baxter v. Dept of 
Transportation, 705 P.2d at 1168: 
If any of these four elements are not satisfied, then summary 
judgment based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not 
available. 
In the present case, the trial court considered and ruled on 
only one of the four tests in granting the Respondent partial 
summary judgment. The trial court's failure to properly analyze 
the issue also constitutes reversible error. 
In addition, application of all four tests to the uncontested 
facts of the present case establishes that the trial court's 
ultimate conclusion, to wit, that the doctrine should be applied, 
was also clearly erroneous. 
The present record reveals that the prior action was brought 
under the Utah unlawful detainer act. In his answer, Appellant, 
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along with the other defendants, did not present the defenses of 
termination of the Lease or the conditional nature of the First 
Amendment to Lease. Following the withdrawal of the defendant's 
counsel in that action, the case preceded to trial on the initial 
pleadings. At the time set for trial, neither the Appellant, his 
co-defendants, nor their counsel appeared. Notwithstanding the 
absence of the defendants or their counsel, the court allowed the 
Plaintiff change his requested relief and call two witnesses and 
present limited testimony to the court.7 
Following Plaintiff's presentation of some evidence, the trial 
court entered judgment against the individual defendant's. Because 
a transcript of the proceeding does not exist there is no record 
of the substance of the evidence presented by Plaintiff. 
Appropriate application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
requires a court find that the factual issues decided in the prior 
adjudication are identical to the ones presented in the subsequent 
case. Under the record in this case there is nothing to support 
7In its complaint in the prior action, Respondent sought 
possession of the leased premises. As additional relief the 
complaint sought rental fees which had accrued prior to service of 
the statutory notice to quit or pay and treble damages for the 
tenant's possession of the premises following service of that 
notice. (Exhibit N-D). However, at the time of trial and in the 
absence of the defendants or their counsel, the plaintiff changed 
its position and requested the trial court rule on the continuing 
enforceability of the First Amended Lease and the defendants' 
status as guarantors thereof. This drastic change of position was 
done without notice to defendants or an opportunity for defendants 
to defend against this new cause of action. This alteration in the 
plaintiff's position in the prior case and the trial court's grant 
of relief which was not prayed for in the complaint constitutes a 
violation of fundamental due process. 
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the conclusion that the issues of the conditional nature of the 
First Amendment to Lease or the termination of the First Amended 
Lease were litigated in the prior action. Because those issues of 
fact were not addressed in the previous action, the Appellant 
should not have been barred from presenting them in this action. 
Finally, the fourth test presented in Searle Bros, requires 
that the issues be competently, fully and fairly litigated. In 
this case, the prior adjudication was a summary proceeding 
undertaken in the absence of the Appellant or his counsel. This 
fact alone should render the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
inapplicable because the prior action was not competently, fully, 
and fairly litigated. 
Under these facts, the factors necessary for the application 
of collateral estoppel has not been fulfilled and the trial court's 
reliance on that doctrine constitutes reversible error. 
ARGUMENT SEVEN 
THE PRIOR ADJUDICATION WHICH DID NOT ADJUDICATE ALL THE 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS WAS NOT A 
FINAL JUDGMENT AND COULD NOT FORM THE BASIS FOR 
APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA 
This Court has consistently required the existence of a final 
judgment before applying the doctrines of collateral estoppel or 
res judicata. Two recent decisions of this Court clearly define 
finality for purposes of the application of those doctrines. 
In Freegard v. First Western Nat. Bank, 738 P.2d 614 (Utah 
1987), the Court was presented with a factual scenario in which 
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the trial court had dismissed a complaint because it determined 
that a prior judgment between the parties required application of 
the doctrine of res judicata. Reversing the dismissal below, the 
Utah Supreme Court relied on the fact that because the prior action 
had not adjudicated all the claims against all the defendants it 
was not final and thus not appealable. Because the first judgment 
was not final under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this 
Court concluded that the doctrine of res judicata had no 
application and that the dismissal was in error. See also Bernard 
v. Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981). 
In Galloway v. Mancrum, 744 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court faced the issue of finality under a very similar 
factual situation. In Galloway, as in the present case, some of 
the original defendants filed for protection under the United 
States Bankruptcy Code while the action was pending. The 
subsequent judgment against the remaining defendant did not 
adjudicate the plaintiff's claims against the bankrupt defendants. 
Notwithstanding the bankruptcies of the other defendants, the 
Utah Supreme Court dismissed the remaining defendant's appeal 
because under Rule 54(b), the judgment was not final and therefore 
not appealable. 
Because the prior judgment entered against the Appellant in 
this case did not adjudicate the Plaintiff's claims against the 
bankrupt defendant, it was not a final judgment and thus not 
appealable. The fact that the prior judgment was not final should 
have precluded the trial court, in the instant case, from invoking 
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the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
ARGUMENT EIGHT 
SATISFACTION OF THE PRIOR JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
FORECLOSED APPELLANT FROM PRESENTING DEFENSES TO 
LIABILITY UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO LEASE 
In granting Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
the district court concluded as a matter of law that the 
satisfaction of the prior judgment rendered that judgment 
sufficiently final for application of the doctrines of claim and 
issue preclusion. 
This Court has repeatedly stated that before a judgment or 
order has preclusive effect it must be final. See Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d at 875, Schaer v. State By & Through 
Utah Dept.. 657 P.2d at 1341. This Court previously held that a 
prior adjudication that did not adjudicate all the claims of all 
the parties was not appealable, not final and therefore could not 
be used as res judicata in a subsequent action. Freegard v. First 
Western National Bank, 738 P.2d 614 (Utah 1987). 
No reported decision that Appellant could find, deviated from 
this general rule. Therefore, because the prior action did not 
adjudicate all the claims against all the parties it was not final 
and should not have been relied upon by the district court to 
foreclose Appellant's presentation of defenses not raised in the 
prior action. 
Outside of Utah, however, some court's have ruled that non-
final decisions may afford some preclusive effect under the 
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doctrine of collateral estoppel. See Sherman v. Jacobson, 247 
F.Supp. 261 (S.D. N.Y. 1965), but See Avondale Shipyards. Inc. v. 
Insured Lloyd's, 786 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1986). This view is 
reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Judgmentsr Section 13, 
(1982) which states that a judgment may be final for purposes of 
issue preclusion if the earlier adjudication was sufficiently firm 
to be accorded conclusive effect. 
This has led some courts to conclude that a final judgment in 
the traditional sense is not essential for the application of issue 
preclusion. See Tausevich v. Bd of Appeals of Stouqhton, 521 
N.E.2d 385, 387 (Mass. 1988). However, the Utah Supreme Court has 
never adopted that position and in all its prior decisions has 
reiterated the necessity of a final judgment on the merits. See 
e.g* Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d at 692. 
Even courts that adopt the Restatement position require the 
analysis of certain factors in determining if a non-appealable 
order is final for purposes of issue preclusion. Those factors are 
generally described as; (1) whether the parties were fully heard 
in the prior action in relation to the issue in question; (2) was 
the judge's decision supported by a reasoned opinion; and (3) was 
the earlier opinion subject to appellate review or in fact 
reviewed. See Tausevich v. Bd of Appeals of Stoughton, 521 N.E.2d 
at 387. 
In the present case, the district court took none of these 
factors into consideration when it concluded that the prior 
judgment was sufficiently final to support a complete bar of any 
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and all defenses that were or could have been raised in the prior 
action.8 
Throughout this proceeding, Appellant has sought to adjudicate 
two defenses to his alleged liability. Those defenses consist of 
the termination of the lease by Respondent's issuance of a 
statutory notice to pay rent or quit and the absence of a condition 
precedent to his liability under the First Amendment to Lease. 
In relation to issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, the 
party relying on the doctrine bears the burden of establishing that 
the prior litigation actually determined the question of fact 
sought to be precluded. See Anderson v. Falcon Drilling Co., 695 
P.2d 521, 526 (Okl. 1985). This restriction of claim preclusion 
to specific issues of fact that have been previously litigated was 
recognized by this Court in Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 
(Utah 1983). As Justice Stewart explained: 
"What is critical (in the application of collateral estoppel) 
is whether the issue that was actually litigated in the first 
suit was essential to resolution of that suit and is the same 
factual issue as that raised in a second suit. Id. 674 P.2d 
at 1230. 
8The district court stopped Appellant from presenting his 
defenses because of its conclusion that the "finality" of the prior 
adjudication was sufficient to invoke the combined doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. In combination the district 
court concluded that these doctrines barred the adjudication of all 
issues and defenses whether actually litigated in the prior action 
or not. Thus, rather than analyzing what defenses were raised in 
the prior action and what issues of fact were actually litigated 
in that case, the district court combined the preclusive effect of 
res -judicata with collateral estoppel and ruled that all issues 
and defenses whether raised in the other proceeding or not were 
barred. This is clearly reversible error. 
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Because of its determination that the prior action was final 
and its erroneous combination of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. the district court failed to undertake any analysis of 
what issues of fact were raised in the prior proceeding. The 
Respondent, who had the burden on that issue failed to present any 
admissible evidence to rebut the presumption that the defenses 
sought to be raised by Appellant had not been adjudicated before. 
Even if this Court reverses the position it has taken in all 
previous cases and holds that the entry of a satisfaction of 
judgment renders a non-appealable judgment final for purposes of 
collateral estoppel, that doctrine can not be applied as a 
comprehensive bar to all defenses whether raised or not in the 
prior action. 
Additionally, the factors that other courts have relied upon 
in finding that a non-appealable order is final are not present 
here. The parties were not fully heard in the prior action. In 
fact, the Appellant and his co-defendants were not even present at 
the trial of that actionc The judge's decision in the prior action 
was not supported by a reasoned opinion and that decision was not 
subject to appellate review. 
Under these circumstances the district court's determination 
that the prior judgment was "final" and that court's convolution 




THE CONDITIONAL NATURE OP THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
TO LEASE REQUIRES REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT 
It is generally recognized that the law of guaranty is part 
of and governed by general contract law. See Moorcroft State Bank 
v. Morel, 701 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1985). Therefore, proper 
interpretation and construction of a guaranty agreement is based 
upon the same principles as applied to contracts generally. See 
Bellevue Square Managers v. Granbercr, 469 P.2d 969 (Wash App. 
1970); Restatement of Security, Section 88. 
In the present case, the trial court found that the First 
Amendment to Lease constituted the agreement of guarantee between 
Appellant and Respondent. Paragraph 9 of the First Amendment to 
Lease conditions the effective date of Appellant's liability upon 
the occurrence of four express conditions. These conditions 
precedent to the liability of the Appellant included the execution 
by the two potential guarantors of a Guarantee of Lease Agreement 
which was to be attached to the First Amendment to Lease as Exhibit 
"C". 
Thus, under the clear and unambiguous language of the First 
Amendment to Lease, the execution of a separate guaranty agreement 
was an express condition precedent to the validity of the Amended 
Lease and the guarantors' liability thereunder. It is clear from 
the unambiguous language of the First Amendment to Lease that the 
parties did not intend the Appellant to be personally liable as a 
guarantor until this Exhibit MC" was executed and the other 
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conditions were fulfilled. 
The Respondent was unable and failed to present an executed 
copy of Exhibit "CM, at the trial of this matter or in support of 
its motion for partial summary judgment. (Rec. p. 725). In the 
absence of this document, Respondent failed to establish the 
fulfillment of an express condition precedent to Appellant's 
liability as a guarantor of the First Amended Lease. 
ARGUMENT TEN 
SERVICE OF STATUTORY NOTICE TO PAY RENT OR VACATE AND 
THE LESSEE'S FAILURE TO PAY TERMINATED THE LEASE 
On July 10, 1984, Respondent caused a three day notice to pay 
rent or vacate to be served upon the Lessee. (Rec. pgs. 595-596). 
The notice was issued in conformity with Utah's unlawful detainer 
statute. 
Following service of this notice and the tenant's failure to 
comply with it, on July 23, 1984, Respondent filed its complaint 
for unlawful detainer in the Third District Court. (Exhibit N-D) . 
In that action Respondent sought to regain possession of the 
leasehold premises and collect past due rents and damages resulting 
from the unlawful detainer of those premises by the tenant. 
(Exhibit N-D). 
The statutory three-day notice to pay rent or vacate 
constitutes a written notification of Respondent's termination of 
the Amended Lease and the cessation of the tenant's obligation to 
make future rental payments pursuant to the terms of that Lease. 
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Both the language of the Utah unlawful detainer statute and 
the allegations of Respondent's original complaint support this 
conclusion. The Utah Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute, Section 
78-36-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides 
at Section 78-36-3(3) that a tenant of real property is guilty of 
an unlawful detainer when he continues in possession, in person or 
by subtenant, after default in the payment of any rent and after 
remaining in possession for a period of three days after service 
of a written notice to pay the rent or surrender the premises. 
Section 78-36-10 provides the statutory remedies for such an 
unlawful detainer which include an order for the restitution of the 
premises, the amount of past rent due and three times the amount 
of damages suffered by the landlord from the unlawful detainer by 
the tenant. 
Respondent's complaint in Civil No. C84-4355 followed this 
statutory scheme and contained allegations that the tenant was in 
default for failure to pay past due rents and was in unlawful 
detainer of the premises by failing to pay the past due amounts or 
vacate the premises within 3 days of the written notice to pay rent 
or vacate. (Exhibit N-D). 
Under the unlawful detainer statute, termination is 
effectuated by the landlord's notice to tenant to pay the past due 
rents or vacate and the tenant's failure to cure the default. See 
Sovereen v. Meadows. 595 P.2d 852, 854 (Utah 1979). In Hackford 
v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982) this Court explained: 
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The basis of a suit in unlawful detainer is unlawful 
possession, and a tenant... is not holding unlawfully until 
he fails to comply with the demand of notice which has been 
properly served on him. (Quoting from Carstensen v. Hansen, 
152 P.2d 954 (Utah 1944)). 
The Utah Supreme Court went on to explain in Hackford that 
when the notice to pay rent or vacate is in compliance with the 
requirements of the unlawful detainer act, it terminates the lease 
and renders the tenant in unlawful possession if the default is not 
cured within the three day period. See Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 
at 1276. See also Dana v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 
1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in Hackford follows a long 
and established line of cases from this Court recognizing that 
service of a notice to pay rent or vacate terminates a lease and 
if not complied with renders the tenant in unlawful possession and 
subject to liability for treble damages. See eg., Lincoln 
Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Utah 1977); 
Jacobson v. Swan, 278 P.2d 294, 301 (Utah 1954). 
If the lease is not terminated by the notice and failure to 
comply therewith, then a tenant would not be in unlawful possession 
and an action for unlawful detainer and treble damages could not 
be brought. If the lease was not terminated until an order of 
restitution was entered by the trial court, then the tenant could 
not be liable for unlawful detainer and treble damages until it 
remained in possession after such an order was entered. Such a 
result is clearly contrary to the provisions of the Utah unlawful 
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detainer statute and the case law interpreting that statute. See 
Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102 at 1105. 
The present case is strikingly similar to the case of In re 
Maxwell, 40 B.R. 231 (D.C. 111. 1984). In Maxwell a sub-tenant 
filed for bankruptcy following the initiation of an action by the 
lessor under the Illinois unlawful detainer statute. The issues 
before the district court in Maxwell are identical to those 
presented in the present case and the district court's treatment 
of those issues is compelling. 
In Maxwell, as in the present case, notice was served under 
the unlawful detainer statute and an action commenced to evict the 
tenant prior to the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. As 
in the present case, the state court had not entered judgment when 
the bankruptcy was filed and the automatic stay imposed. 
In Maxwell the bankruptcy court concluded that in the absence 
of a final judgment on the forcible entry and detainer suit, the 
sublease had not been terminated. Reversing the bankruptcy court's 
conclusion, the district court in Maxwell held that it was clear 
under Illinois law that by sending the five-day notice and by 
filing a suit for possession the lessor terminated the sublease. 
Id, 40 B.R. 236. As the district court explained: 
In Illinois the statutory notice procedure for terminating a 
lease and a forcible entry and detainer action are two 
distinct things. The former process ends the contractual 
relationship between the parties while the forcible entry and 
detainer action determines rights to possession of property. 
Id, 40 B.R. at 237. 
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Similarly, in Utah service of the statutory notice and the 
tenant's failure to respond thereto terminates the lease and 
renders the tenant in unlawful possession of the premises. This 
dispositive issue was not raised or litigated in the prior action 
and Appellant was denied an opportunity to present it in the 
present case because of the trial court's erroneous application of 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
ARGUMENT ELEVEN 
APPELLANT'S INVOLUNTARY PAYMENT OF A PORTION 
OF THE PRIOR JUDGMENT DID NOT REPRESENT AN ACQUIESCENCE 
IN THAT JUDGMENT OR MOOT AN APPEAL THEREFROM 
In its Memorandum Decision the district court concluded as a 
matter of law that the satisfaction of the prior judgment rendered 
that judgment final for purposes of res judicata. In addition, the 
court concluded that by paying a portion of the prior judgment, 
Appellant had waived his right to any appeal of that judgment. 
As a general rule, one who acquiesces in a judgment by 
transferring property or paying a damage award can not later attack 
that judgment on appeal. See Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 
1987). However, this general rule has two exceptions. The general 
rule does not necessarily prevent an appeal as to separate and 
independent claims if it is shown that a controversy remains in 
regard thereto. See Hollinasworth v. Farmers Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 
637, 639 (Utah 1982) . 
In addition, the general rule does not apply when the payment 
or satisfaction of the judgment was involuntary. See Intern. 
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Business Mach. Corp. v. Lawhorn, 677 P.2d 507 (Idaho App. 1984). 
In Lawhorn. the Idaho Court of Appeals held that payment of a 
judgment to prevent or avert execution on an appellant's property 
was not voluntarily made and therefore refused to invoke the 
general rule. 
In the present case, the Respondent had initiated extensive 
collection efforts against Appellant in both New York and Utah. 
Appellant has extensive property holdings in those states. In an 
effort to avert Respondent's inevitable execution on a portion of 
his property, Appellant entered into an agreement with Respondent 
regarding the payment of the judgment amount which was not paid 
under Respondent's stipulation with the Debtor. Appellant entered 
into the stipulation with Respondent involuntarily and as a direct 
result of Respondent's collection efforts. The same element of 
compulsion is present in this case as existed in Lawhorn. 
Because Appellant's involuntary payment of a portion of the 
judgment amount was involuntary, the district court's application 
of the general rule constitutes reversible error. 
ARGUMENT TWELVE 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF 
A HEARSAY AFFIDAVIT FILED AFTER THE TRIAL 
BY RESPONDENT CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
Following the close of Respondent's case and more than thirty 
days after the conclusion of the trial of this matter, counsel for 
Respondent submitted the affidavit of Kris C. Rainey to the 
district court for consideration. (Rec. p. 701-703). In that 
ACY/ms 43 
affidavit, Mr. Rainey, who is a member of the Utah Sate Bar, 
recounted a conversation that he had with the Honorable Glen E. 
Clark, United States Bankruptcy Judge, during a luncheon meeting. 
(Rec. p. 701-702) 
In the affidavit, Mr. Rainey explained that upon direct 
inquiry Judge Clark stated that rejection of a lease under the 
provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code would not result 
in a termination of that lease. (Rec. p. 701-702). This precise 
question of law was a major defense to Appellant's alleged 
liability and represented a critical part of the trial process. 
Upon being notified of the ex-parte submission of this 
affidavit, Appellant immediately filed a Motion to Strike and 
Impose Sanctions against Respondent. (Rec. p. 718-720). Several 
days after receiving the affidavit, the district court called 
counsel for both parties to chambers and informed counsel that 
after consideration of everything that had been submitted, 
including the affidavit of Mr. Rainey, the court would rule that 
the rejection of the lease under the Bankruptcy Code did not 
terminate the lease. 
The district court's receipt and consideration of Mr. Rainey's 
heresay affidavit has extremely prejudicial to Appellant and 
constitutes reversible error for several reasons. 
In the first place, the affidavit contained the heresay 
declaration of Judge Clark. It is universally recognized that 
heresay evidence presented by affidavit is inadmissible and may 
not be considered by the court. See In re Marriage of Morrison, 
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613 P.2d 557, 560 (Wash. App. 1980). 
Secondly, the affidavit was submitted, ex-parte, after the 
completion of the trial and the close of Respondent's case. Such 
an ex-parte submission of an affidavit has been held to be neither 
legal nor competent evidence. See Zinn v. Tobin Packing Co. . Inc., 
438 P.2d 1110, 1114 (Vt. 1981). 
In addition, the heresay affidavit allegedly presented the 
bankruptcy judge's opinion regarding a legal issue, to wit, the 
legal effect of the rejection of the Lease. A trial court can not 
consider an affidavit which merely states the affiant's or a 
heresay declarant's legal conclusions. See Ward v. Durham Life 
Ins. , Co., 368 S.E.2d 391, 393 (N.C. App. 1988). 
Finally, the affidavit purports to represent a statement of 
legal opinion by a bankruptcy judge on the very issue of bankruptcy 
law under consideration by the district court. The appearance of 
impropriety created by Respondent's submission of such a document 
is sufficient to have required it be stricken by the district 
court. See Phillips v. Clancy, 733 P.2d 300 (Ariz. App. 1986). 
The fact that the district court refused to strike the heresay 
affidavit of Mr. Rainey and considered its contents in reaching its 
decision on a critical issue of law constitutes an abuse of 
discretion and reversible error. 
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ARGUMENT THIRTEEN 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE UNCERTIFIED EXHIBITS 
ATTACHED TO RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF ITS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
Following the filing of Appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, on September 15/ 1988/ Respondent filed a pleading 
entitled Memorandum Opposing Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion 
and Supporting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
(Rec. pgs. 151-199). Attached to Respondent's Memorandum were six 
exhibits. On September 16/ 1988/ Appellant filed a Motion to 
Strike the exhibits attached to Respondent's memorandum. On 
September 19/ 1988/ a hearing was held on the cross motions for 
summary judgment and Appellant's Motion to Strike. (Rec. p. 200). 
On October 13/ 1988/ the district court entered a Minute Entry 
in which he granted Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and denied Appellant's Motion to Strike and Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (Rec. p. 322). On that same dayf counsel for 
Respondent filed a personal affidavit in an apparent attempt to 
remedy the deficiencies of its prior pleadings. (Rec. pgs. 371-
460). 
The district court's denial of Appellant's Motion to Strike 
and consideration of Respondent's affidavit constitutes reversible 
error. Rule 569 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ sets forth the 
procedure to be employed in the district courts of the state of 
Utah for summary judgments. Subsection (b) of that rule provides 
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that a party against whom a claim is asserted may move with or 
without supporting affidavits for summary judgment in his favor. 
Rule 56(c) states that the adversary party prior to the day of 
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. 
Subparagraph (c) of Rule 56 also states that sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto and served therewith. In the 
present case, Respondent filed no affidavits or sworn or certified 
copies of papers prior to the hearing on Appellant's motion for 
summary judgment. Rather than presenting any facts by means of 
affidavit as required by Rule 56, Respondent simply argued numerous 
facts in its opposing memorandum and attached uncertified copies 
of numerous documents thereto.9 
Rule 56(e) like its federal counterpart requires that all 
papers relied upon in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
must be sworn or certified and documents filed as exhibits that are 
not certified or accompanied by appropriate authenticating 
affidavits are inadmissible and should not be considered by the 
court. See Nolla Morell v. Riefkohl, 651 F.Supp 134, 140 (D. 
Puerto Rico 1986). See also In re Teltronics Services, Inc., 18 
BR 705, 707 (D.C. E.D. N.Y. 1982). 
Notwithstanding the Respondent's blatant disregard of the 
9Although counsel for Respondent subsequently filed an 
affidavit after the hearing, that affidavit was filed untimely and 
was not made on personal knowledge. Therefore, it should not have 
been considered by the district court. See Murray City v. Hall, 
663 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah 1983); Ward v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 368 
S.E.2d 391, 393 (N.C. App. 1988). 
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procedural requirements of Rule 56, the district court denied 
Appellant's well founded motion to strike. This denial of his 
motion to strike greatly prejudiced Appellant and constitutes 
reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the district court's numerous errors, the Judgment 
entered against Appellant should be reversed in its entirety and 
the case remanded to the district court with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of Appellant dismissing Respondent's Complaint 
with prejudice. 
Dated this /fet day of December, 1989 
Dctniel W. Jackson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /far day of December, 1989, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Douglas Mortensen 
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
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Rule 55 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 47i 
as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in con-
nection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers 
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his 
costs must within five days after the entry of 
judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memoran-
dum of the items of his costs and necessary dis-
bursements in the action, and file with the court 
a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, 
and that the disbursements have been necessar-
ily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party 
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within 
seven days after service of the memorandum of 
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed 
by the court in which the judgment was ren-
dered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after 
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and 
filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the 
judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment 
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the 
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the 
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985). 
Rule 55. Default 
(a) Default 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default. 
(2) Notice to party in default After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision (ax 1) of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaulting party. 
(b) Judgment Judgment by default may be en-
tered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plain tiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of this state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and j 
he is not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the part 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply t 
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the com 
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it i 
necessary to take an account or to determine th 
amount of damages or to establish the truth c 
any averment by evidence or to make an investi 
gation of any other matter, the court may COD 
duct such hearings or order such references as i 
deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default For good cause show] 
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewis 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claim 
ants. The provisions of this rule apply whether th 
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plain 
tiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleade 
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgmen 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c] 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer o 
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en 
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer o 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes hi 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to th 
court. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4. 1985.) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upoi 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain i 
declaratory judgment may. at any time after the expi 
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac 
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg 
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup 
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa 
vor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom i 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or J 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum 
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any par 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo 
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the tin* 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to th 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. Th 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if th< 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, i 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to an] 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on th< 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuin< 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
id) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If oi 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upoi 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial i 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, ty 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before i 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as 
certain what material facts exist without substantia 
controversy and what material facts are actually ax* 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon mak 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub 
stantial controversy, including the extent to whici 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro 
versy, and directing such further proceedings in th 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action th 
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facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; de-
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or cer-
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, 
shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right 
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circum-
stances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and 
39. The existence of another adequate remedy does 
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases 
where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy 
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and 
may advance it on the calendar. 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless 
^e court otherwise directs and subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a 
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed, 
u there is a special verdict or a general verdict ac-
companied by answers to interrogatories returned by 
a
 jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the 
aPpropriate judgment which shall be forthwith 
signed by the clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided 
|& Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of 
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
^ d filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in regis-
kr of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is 
^uiplete and shall be deemed entered for all pur-
Poses, except the creation of a lien on real property, 
*hen the same is signed and filed as herein above 
P^vided. The clerk shall immediately make a nota-
tion of the judgment in the register of actions and the 
judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The 
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the 
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and 
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk 
of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of 
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of 
this provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party 
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact 
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be 
rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judg-
ment by confession is authorized by statute, the party 
seeking the same must file with the clerk of the court 
in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, 
verified by the defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money 
due or to become due, it shall concisely state the 
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the 
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contin-
gent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not ex-
ceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for 
a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the state-
ment, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment 
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of 
entry, if any. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985 and Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment. 
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judg-
ment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any 
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof, 
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor 
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed 
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within 
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the 
following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly ac-
knowledged by such owner or attorney; or i2) by ac-
knowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the 
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the 
judgment in the county where first docketed, with the 
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satis-
faction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more 
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid 
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming 
them. 
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judg-
ment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of 
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall 
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was 
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof, 
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to 
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the 
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered 
upon the docket. 
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction 
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the 
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case, 
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also 
enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, in-
cluding the amount paid, on the margin of the judg-
ment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfac-
tion. 
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall 
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any 
78-36-1 JUDICIAL CODE 370; 
CHAPTER 36 
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER 
Section 
78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined. 
78-36-2. "Forcible detainer" defined. 
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term 
less than life. 
78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to 
hold over. 
78-36-5. Remedies available to tenant against 
undertenant. 
78-36-6. Notice to quit — How served. 
78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant. 
78-36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint — 
Time for appearance — Service of 
summons. 
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alterna-
tive remedies. 
78-36-9. Proof required by plaintiff — Defense. 
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and 
rent — Immediate enforcement — 
Treble damages. 
78-36-11. Time for appeal. 
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial pro-
cess prohibited — Abandoned prem-
ises excepted. 
78-36-12.3. Definitions. 
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking and 
rerenting by owner — Liability of ten-
ant — Personal property of tenant left 
on premises. 
78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who ei-
ther: 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other 
parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or 
stealth, or by any kind of violence or circum-
stances of terror, enters upon or into any real 
property; or, 
(2) after entering peaceably upon real prop-
erty, turns out by force, threats or menacing con-
duct the party in actual possession. 1953 
78-36-2. "Forcible detainer" defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who 
either: 
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of vio-
lence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession 
of any real property, whether the same was ac-
quired peaceably or otherwise; or, 
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of 
the occupants of any real property, unlawfully 
enters thereon, and, after demand made for the 
surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three 
days to surrender the same to such former occu-
pant. The occupant of real property within the 
meaning of this subdivision is one who within 
five days preceding such unlawful entry was in 
the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such 
lands. 1953 
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term 
less than life. 
(1)A tenant of real property, for a term less than 
life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, 
after the expiration of the specified term or pe-
riod for which it is let to him, which specified 
term or period, whether established by express or 
implied contract, or whether written or parol? 
shall be terminated without notice at the expira-
tion of the specified term or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for ani 
indefinite time with monthly or other periodic 
rent reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in per-' 
son or by subtenant after the end of any 
month or period, in cases where the owner 
his designated agent, or any successor in es^ 
tate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to 
the end of that month or period, has served 
notice requiring him to quit the premises at 
the expiration of that month or period; <&) 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he^  
remains in possession of the premises after 
the expiration of a notice of not less than five, 
days; 
(c) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, after default in the payment of 
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring 
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the 
surrender of the detained premises, has re* 
mained uncomplied with for a period of three 
days after service, which notice may be served at 
any time after the rent becomes due; ;* 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased 
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, 
or commits or permits waste on the premises, or 
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful busi-
ness on or in the premises, or when he suffers, 
permits, or maintains on or about the premises; 
any nuisance, and remains in possession after 
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit;* 
or ; 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to per-, 
form any condition or covenant of the lease or4 
agreement under which the property is held,, 
other than those previously mentioned, and after; 
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or the 
surrender of the property, served upon him and. 
upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the; 
premises remains uncomplied with for three days; 
after service. Within three days after the service 
of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual; 
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the 
term, or other person interested in its contin-, 
uance may perform the condition or covenant and 
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except., 
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease 
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be per-; 
formed, then no notice need be given. 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a 
mobile home is determined under Chapter 16, Titles 
57, Mobile Home Park Residency Act. ***i 
..Jm 
78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands tftj 
hold over. " ?| 
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands^ 
where the tenant has held over and retained posses-
sion for more than 60 days after the expiration of his; 
term without any demand of possession or notice to 
quit by the owner, his designated agent, or his succes-, 
sor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by peraiiBj 
sion of the owner, his designated agent, or his succefl^  
sor in estate, and shall be entitled to hold under tbjjj 
terms of the lease for another full year, and shall ltffe 
be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that yea^ 
and the holding over for the 60-day period shall W| 
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taken and construed as a consent on the part of the 
tenant to hold for another year. i»8i 
78-36-5- Remedies available to tenant against 
undertenant 
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those 
nrescribed in this chapter to obtain possession of the 
nremises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful 
detention of the premises underlet to him. 1953 
78-36-6. Not ice to quit — H o w s e r v e d . 
i; iphe notices required by the preceding sections may 
jbe served: 
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant person-
ally; 
(2) by sending a copy through registered or 
certified mail addressed to the tenant at his place 
of residence; 
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or 
from his usual place of business, by leaving a 
copy with a person of suitable age and discretion 
at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant 
at the address of his place of residence or place of 
business; or 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion can-
not be found at the place of residence, then by 
affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the 
leased property. Service upon a subtenant may 
be made in the same manner. 1987 
r78-36-7. N e c e s s a r y part i e s d e f e n d a n t . 
f: No person other than the tenant of the premises, 
and subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation 
flf the premises when the action is commenced, need 
"be made a party defendant in the proceeding, nor 
mall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be non-
Suited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might 
lave been made a party defendant; but when it ap-
|«ars that any of the parties served with process or 
ippearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment 
must be rendered against them. In case a person has 
Become subtenant of the premises in controversy af-
Br the service of any notice in this chapter provided 
Rr, the fact that such notice was not served on such 
Subtenant shall constitute no defense to the action. 
HA persons who enter under the tenant after the com-
pencement of the action hereunder shall be bound by 
jne judgment the same as if they had been made par-
B»s to the action. 1953 
E|36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint — 
Br Time for appearance — Service of 
•?• summons. 
W^e plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting 
jyth the facts on which he seeks to recover, may set 
• P a any circumstances of fraud, force, OT violence 
•rah may have accompanied the alleged forcible 
R^y* or forcible or unlawful detainer, and claim 
BJPages therefor or compensation for the occupation 
Bpke premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer 
Bffifed is after default in the payment of rent, the 
Bgplaint shall state the amount of rent due. The 
W&r-j ^all indorse on the summons the number of 
BE* within which the defendant is required to ap-
KR and defend the action, which shall not be less 
B9j three or more than 20 days from the date of 
Bp? 6 ' The court may authorize service by publica-
KP or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is 
•PPlete one week after publication. Service by mail 
IBflH-?6*6 t n r e e ^ a v s a ^ e r rnsLiling. The summons 
E $ | j be changed in form to conform to the time of 
H ^ v ^ as ordered, and shall be served as in other 
™ ^ * 1987 
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alter-
native remedies. 
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint 
and the entry of final judgment, the plaintifT may 
execute and file a possession bond. The bond may be 
in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified 
funds, or a property bond executed by two persons 
who own real property in the state and who are not 
parties to the action. The court shall approve the 
bond in an amount that is the probable amount of 
costs of suit and damages which may result to the 
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted. 
The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for 
the benefit of the defendant for all costs and damages 
actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
shall notify the defendant that he has filed a posses-
sion bond. This notice shall be served in the same 
manner as service of summons and shall inform the 
defendant of all of the alternative remedies and pro-
cedures under Subsection (2). 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and pro-
cedures applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a 
possession bond under Subsection 1>: 
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer ac-
tion based solely upon nonpayment of rent or 
utilities, the existing contract shall remain in 
force and the complaint shall be dismissed if the 
defendant, within three days of the service of the 
notice of the possession bond, oays accrued rent, 
utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, in-
cluding attorney's fees, as provided in the rental 
agreement. 
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if 
he executes and files a counter bond in the form 
of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, 
or a property bond executed by two persons who 
own real property in the state and who are not 
parties to the action. The form of the bond is at 
the defendant's option. The bond shall be payable 
to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file 
the bond prior to the expiration of three days 
from the date he is served with notice of the fil-
ing of plaintiffs possession bond The court shall 
approve the bond in an amount that is the proba-
ble amount of costs of suit and actual damages 
that may result to the plaintiff if the defendant 
has improperly withheld possession. The court 
shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a por-
tion of the defendant's total bond. 
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be 
granted a hearing to be held prior to the expira-
tion of three days from the date the defendant is 
served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs pos-
session bond. 
{?>) If the defendant does not elect and comply wi th 
a remedy under Subsection (2) within the required 
time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be 
granted an order of restitution. The constable of the 
precinct or the sheriff of the county where the prop-
erty is situated shall return possession of the prop-
erty to the plaintiff promptly. 
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Sub-
section (2)(c), and if the court rules after the hearing 
that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the prop-
erty, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return 
possession of the property to the plaintiff. If at the 
hearing the court allows the defendant to remain in 
possession and further issues remain to be adjudi-
cated between the parties, the court shall require the 
defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection 
(2)(b). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues 
between the parties can be adjudicated without fur-
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ther court proceedings, the court shall, upon adjudi-
cating those issues, enter judgment on the merits. 
1987 
78-36-9. Proof required by plaintiff — Defense. 
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry 
or forcible detainer the plaintiff shall only be re-
quired to show, in addition to the forcible entry or 
forcible detainer complained of, that he was peace-
ably in the actual possession at the time of the forc-
ible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the 
time of the forcible detainer. The defendant may 
show in his defense that he or his ancestors, or those 
whose interest in such premises he claims, had been 
in the quiet possession thereof for the space of one 
whole year continuously next before the commence-
ment of the proceedings, and that his interest therein 
is not then ended or determined; and such showing is 
a bar to the proceedings. 1953 
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages , 
and rent — Immediate enforcement — 
Treble damages . 
( 1 ) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or 
upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the 
plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of 
the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful de-
tainer after neglect or failure to perform any condi-
tion or covenant of the lease or agreement under 
which the property is held, or after default in the 
payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the 
forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried 
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall 
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff 
from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defen-
dant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the com-
plaint and proved at trial; and 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged un-
lawful detainer is after default in the payment of 
rent. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the de-
fendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the 
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through 
(2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are 
provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after 
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon 
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the 
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may 
be issued and enforced immediately. 1987 
78-36-11. T ime for appeal . 
Either party may, within ten days, appeal from the 
judgment rendered. 1953 
78-36-12. E x c l u s i o n of t enant w i thout judic ia l 
process prohibited — Abandoned 
premises excepted. 
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a 
tenant from the tenant's premises in any manner ex-
cept by judicial process, provided, an owner or his 
agent shall not be prevented from removing the con-
tents of the leased premises under Subsection 
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempt-
ing to rent them at a fair rental value when the ten-
ant has abandoned the premises. 1981 
78-36-12.3. Definit ions. 
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the ten. 
ant from entering into the premises with intent to 
deprive the tenant of such entry. 
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the prenv 
ises and shall also have the same meaning as land-
lord under common law and the statutes of this state, 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of thefol-. 
lowing situations: 
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that 
he or she will be absent from the premises, and 
the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after 
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence 
other than the presence of the tenant's personal 
property that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises; or ' .^ 
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that' 
he or she will be absent from the premises, and< 
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the" 
tenant's personal property has been removed 
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable 
evidence that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises. 1961 
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking 
and rerenting by owner — Liability of 
tenant — Personal property of tenant 
le/t on premises. 
(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may 
retake the premises and attempt to rent them at a 
fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the 
premises shall be liable: 
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of 
the term: or :^  
(b) for rent accrued during the period neces-
sary to re-rent the premises at a fair rental 
value, plus the difference between the fair rental 
value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental 
agreement, plus a reasonable commission for the 
renting of the premises and the costs, if any, nec-
essary to restore the rental unit to its condition 
when rented by the tenant less normal wear anil 
tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsec-
tion (a) notwithstanding that the owner did not 
re-rent the premises. 
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and 
has left personal property on the premises, the owner 
is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, 
store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and 
storage costs from the tenant. The owner shall make 
reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the location 
of the personal property; however, if the property has 
been in storage for over 30 days and the tenant has 
made no reasonable effort to recover it, the owner 
may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward 
any amount the tenant owes. Any money left over 
from the sale of the property shall be handled as spec-
ified in Section 78-44-18. Nothing contained in this 
act shall be in derogation of or alter the ownerfs 
rights under Chapter 3, Title 38. M* 
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read another meaning into section 330 in order to arrive at a prefera-
ble result. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Levin & Weintraub (In re Flag-
staff Foodservice Corp.), 739 F.2d 73, 10 C.B.C.2d 1309 (2d Cir. 
1984). 
The knowledge of the pendency of an appeal from a bankruptcy 
court's order granting a lender special priority does not, in itself, 
forfeit the protections that the Code gives to a lender even though the 
lender knows that there are objections to the order; however, if the 
lender knows his priority is improper but proceeds anyway in the 
hope that a stay will not be sought or if sought will not be granted, 
the lender is acting in bad faith and upon appeal the priority should 
not be allowed. In the Matter of EDC Holding Co., 676 F.2d 945, 6 
C.B.C.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1982). 
A bankruptcy court order authorizing a chapter 11 trustee to ob-
tain credit secured by a senior lien is not clearly erroneous when 
there is substantial evidence that the trustee would not have been 
able to obtain adequate credit without granting of such lien. In the 
Matter of Stanley Motel, Inc., 6 C.B.C.2d 116 (D. Colo. 1982). 
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SECTION 366 (11 U.S.C. § 365) 
§ 365. Executory contracts and unexpired leases. 
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title 
and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, 
subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any exec-
utory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor. 
(b)(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract 
or unexpired lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume 
such contract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of such 
contract or lease, the trustee— 
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(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the 
trustee will promptly cure, such default; 
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that 
the trustee will promptly compensate, a party other 
than the debtor to such contract or lease, for any actual 
pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such de-
fault; and 
(C) provides adequate assurance of future perfor-
mance under such contract or lease. 
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a 
default that is a breach of a provision relating to— 
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor 
at any time before the closing of the case; 
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or 
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a 
trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before 
such commencement. 
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection 
and paragraph (2)(B) of subsection (f), adequate assur-
ance of future performance of a lease of real property in a 
shopping center includes adequate assurance— 
(A) of the source of rent and other consideration due 
under such lease, and in the case of an assignment, that 
the financial condition and operating performance of 
the proposed assignee and its guarantors, if any, shall 
be similar to the financial condition and operating per-
formance of the debtor and its guarantors, if any, as of 
the time the debtor became the lessee under the lease; 
(B) that any percentage rent due under such lease 
will not decline substantially; 
(C) that assumption or assignment of such lease is 
subject to all the provisions thereof, including (but not 
limited to) provisions such as a radius, location, use, or 
exclusivity provision, and will not breach any such pro-
vision contained in any other lease, financing agree-
ment, or master agreement relating to such shopping 
center; and 
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(D) that assumption or assignment of such lease will 
not disrupt any tenant mix or balance in such shopping 
center. 
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, 
if there has been a default in an unexpired lease of the 
debtor, other than a default of a kind specified in para-
graph (2) of this subsection, the trustee may not require a 
lessor to provide services or supplies incidental to such 
lease before assumption of such lease unless the lessor is 
compensated under the terms of such lease for any ser-
vices and supplies provided under such lease before as-
sumption of such lease. 
(c) The trustee may not assume or assign an executory con-
tract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such con-
tract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or del-
egation of duties, if— 
(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the 
debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting perfor-
mance from or rendering performance to an entity other 
than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not 
such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of 
rights or delegation of duties; and 
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption 
or assignment; or 
(2) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend 
other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or 
for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security of the 
debtor; or 
(3) such lease is of nonresidential real property and has 
been terminated under applicable nonbankruptcy law 
prior to the order for relief. 
(d)(1) In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee 
does not assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired 
lease of residential real property or of personal property of the 
debtor within 60 days after the order for relief, or within such 
additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day per-
iod, fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected. 
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(2) In a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, 
the trustee may assume or reject an executory contract or 
unexpired lease of residential real property or of personal 
property of the debtor at any time before the confirmation 
of a plan but the court, on request of any party to such 
contract or lease, may order the trustee to determine 
within a specified period of time whether to assume or re-
ject such contract or lease. 
(3) The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations 
of the debtor, except those specified in section 365(b)(2), 
arising from and after the order for relief under any un-
expired lease of nonresidential real property, until such 
lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 
503(b)(1) of this title. The court may extend, for cause, 
the time for performance of any such obligation that 
arises within 60 days after the date of the order for relief, 
but the time for performance shall not be extended beyond 
such 60-day period. This subsection shall not be deemed to 
affect the trustee's obligations under the provisions of 
subsection (b) or (f) of this section. Acceptance of any 
such performance does not constitute waiver or relinquish-
ment of the lessor's rights under such lease or under this 
title. 
(4) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), in a case 
under any chapter of this title, if the trustee does not as-
sume or reject an unexpired lease of nonresidential real 
property under which the debtor is the lessee within 60 
days after the date of the order for relief, or within such 
additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day 
period, fixes, then such lease is deemed rejected, and the 
trustee shall immediately surrender such nonresidential 
real property to the lessor. 
(e)(1) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract 
or unexpired lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract 
or unexpired lease of the debtor may not be terminated or 
modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or 
lease may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the 
commencement of the case solely because of a provision in such 
contract or lease that is conditioned on— 
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(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor 
at any time before the closing of the case; 
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or 
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a 
trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before 
such commencement. 
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to 
an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, 
whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts 
assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if— 
(A)(i) applicable law excuses a party, other than the 
debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting perfor-
mance from or rendering performance to the trustee or 
to an assignee of such contract or lease, whether or not 
such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment 
of rights or delegation of duties; and 
(ii) such party does not consent to such assumption 
or assignment; or 
(B) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or ex-
tend other debt financing or financial accommodations, 
to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security 
of the debtor. 
(f)(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, 
notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unex-
pired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits, 
restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or 
lease, the trustee may assign such contract or lease under para-
graph (2) of this subsection. 
(2) The trustee may assign an executory contract or un-
expired lease of the debtor only if— 
(A) the trustee assumes such contract or lease in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this section; and 
(B) adequate assurance of future performance by the 
assignee of such contract or lease is provided, whether 
or not there has been a default in such contract or lease. 
(3) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory con-
tract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law 
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that terminates or modifies, or permits a party other than 
the debtor to terminate or modify, such contract or lease 
or a right or obligation under such contract or lease on ac-
count of an assignment of such contract or lease, such con-
tract, lease, right, or obligation may not be terminated or 
modified under such provision because of the assumption 
or assignment of such contract or lease by the trustee. 
(g) Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of 
this section, the rejection of an executory contract or unex-
pired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract 
or lease— 
(1) if such contract or lease has not been assumed under 
this section or under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, 
11, 12, or 13 of this title, immediately before the date of 
the filing of the petition; or 
(2) if such contract or lease has been assumed under 
this section or under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, 
11,12, or 13 of this title— 
(A) if before such rejection the case has not been con-
verted under section 1112, 1307, or 1208 of this title, at 
the time of such rejection; or 
(B) if before such rejection the case has been con-
verted under section 1112,1307, or 1208 of this title— 
(i) immediately before the date of such conversion, 
if such contract or lease was assumed before such con-
version; or 
(ii) at the time of such rejection, if such contract or 
lease was assumed after such conversion. 
(h)(1) If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real prop-
erty of the debtor under which the debtor is the lessor, or a 
timeshare interest under a timeshare plan under which the 
debtor is the timeshare interest seller, the lessee or timeshare 
interest purchaser under such lease or timeshare plan may 
treat such lease or timeshare plan as terminated by such rejec-
tion, where the disaffirmance by the trustee amounts to such a 
breach as would entitle the lessee or timeshare interest pur-
chaser to treat such lease or timeshare plan as terminated by 
virtue of its own terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or 
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other agreements the lessee or timeshare interest purchaser has 
made with other parties; or, in the alternative, the lessee or 
timeshare interest purchaser may remain in possession of the 
leasehold or timeshare interest under any lease or timeshare 
plan the term of which has commenced for the balance of such 
term and for any renewal or extension of such term that is en-
forceable by such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
(2) If such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser re-
mains in possession as provided in paragraph (1) of this 
subsection, such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser 
may offset against the rent reserved under such lease or 
moneys due for such timeshare interest for the balance of 
the term after the date of the rejection of such lease or 
timeshare interest, and any such renewal or extension 
thereof, any damages occurring after such date caused by 
the nonperformance of any obligation of the debtor under 
such lease or timeshare plan after such date, but such les-
see or timeshare interest purchaser does not have any 
rights against the estate on account of any damages aris-
ing after such date from such rejection, other than such 
offset. 
(i)(l) If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the 
debtor for the sale of real property or for the sale of a time-
share interest under a timeshare plan, under which the pur-
chaser is in possession, such purchaser may treat such contract 
as terminated, or, in the alternative, may remain in possession 
of such real property or timeshare interest. 
(2) if such purchaser remains in possession— 
(A) such purchaser shall continue to make all pay-
ments due under such contract, but may, offset against 
such payments any damages occurring after the date of 
the rejection of such contract caused by the non-perfor-
mance of any obligation of the debtor after such date, 
but such purchaser does not have any rights against the 
estate on account of any damages arising after such 
date from such rejection, other than such offset; and 
(B) the trustee shall deliver title to such purchaser in 
accordance with the provisions of such contract, but is 
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relieved of all other obligations to perform under such 
contract. 
(j) A purchaser that treats an executory contract as termi-
nated under subsection (i) of this section, or a party whose ex-
ecutory contract to purchase real property from the debtor is 
rejected and under which such party is not in possession, has a 
lien on the interest of the debtor in such property for the re-
covery of any portion of the purchase price that such pur-
chaser or party has paid. 
(k) Assignment by the trustee to an entity of a contract or 
lease assumed under this section relieves the trustee and the 
estate from any liability for any breach of such contract or 
lease occurring after such assignment. 
(1) If an unexpired lease under which the debtor is the lessee 
is assigned pursuant to this section, the lessor of the property 
may require a deposit or other security for the performance of 
the debtor's obligations under the lease substantially the same 
as would have been required by the landlord upon the initial 
leasing to a similar tenant. 
(m) For purposes of this section 365 and sections 541(b)(2) 
and 362(b)(10), leases of real property shall include any rental 
agreement to use real property. 
Legislative History 
Subsection (a) of this section authorizes the trustee, subject to the 
court's approval, to assume or reject an executory contract or unex-
pired lease. Though there is no precise definition of what contracts 
are executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance 
remains due to some extent on both sides. A note is not usually an 
executory contract if the only performance that remains is repay-
ment. Performance on one side of the contract would have been com-
pleted and the contract is no longer executory. 
Because of the sensitive nature of the commodities markets and 
the special provisions governing commodity broker liquidations in 
sub-chapter IV of chapter 7, the provisions governing rejection, liq-
uidation, or termination of open contractual commitments under pro-
posed 11 U.S.C. § 765, and the provisions governing distribution in 
proposed 11 U.S.C. § 767 (a) and (c) [should be section 766] will gov-
ern if any conflict between those provisions and the provisions of this 
section arise. 
[House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977); See Senate 
Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978). ] 
In rt GILES ASSOCIATES, 
LTD., Debtor. 
Bankruptcy No. 88-50040-A. 
United States Bankruptcy Court, 
W.D. Texas, 
San Antonio Division. 
Aug. 8, 1988. 
Landlord filed motion seeking to have 
commercial lease deemed rejected. The 
Bankruptcy Court, R. Glen Ayers, Jr., 
Chief Judge, held that automatic rejection 
of a lease based on a debtor's failure to 
assume or reject lease within 60 days after 
filing was not merely "breach" of lease, 
but, rather, terminated lease as to all par-
ties, including secured creditors. 
So ordered. 
1. Bankruptcy <&=>3115 
Automatic rejection of a lease based on 
a debtor's failure to assume or reject lease 
within 60 days after filing was not merely 
"breach" of lease, but, rather, terminated 
lease as to all parties, including secured 
creditors. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 365(dX4). 
2. Bankruptcy <s=>3103(8) 
Bankruptcy Code provision for auto-
matic rejection of lease upon debtor's fail-
ure to assume or reject within 60 days of 
filing of petition is not affected by separate 
state law doctrines concerning termination 
of lease, including strong presumption un-
der state law that there could be no implied 
termination and forfeiture of lease. 
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(d)(4). 
3. Bankruptcy <*=>3103(8) 
Lease provision requiring some notice 
of breach by landlord to debtor lessee was 
irrelevant to deemed rejection of lease 
based upon debtor's failure to assume or 
reject within 60 days of filing of Chapter 11 
petition; deemed rejection occurs as matter 
of law under Bankruptcy Code, rather than 
due to any contractual breach by debtor 
lessee. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 365(d)(4). 
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4. Bankruptcy <*=»3103(8) 
Landlord's acceptance of rental pay-
ments from lienholder on behalf of debtor 
lessee, without some pleading being filed in 
bankruptcy court, was not acceptance, as-
sumption, or some other treatment of lease 
by landlord, and thus did not preclude lease 
from being deemed rejected due to debtor's 
failure to assume or reject within 60 days 
postpetitdon. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 365(d)(4). 
5. Bankruptcy ^3103(8) 
Landlord's knowledge of lienholder's 
security interest in Chapter 11 debtor's 
lease did not impose any affirmative duty 
on landlord concerning rights of lienholder 
required to be exercised before lease could 
be deemed rejected based on debtor's fail-
ure to assume or reject within 60 days 
postpetition. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 365(d)(4). 
6. Bankruptcy <s=>3114 
Default based on Chapter 11 debtor's 
failure to assume or reject lease within 60 
days was not default under lease, and thus, 
lease provision granting option allowing 
debtor lienholder to cure defects under 
lease was inapplicable. Bankr.Code, 11 
U.S.C.A. § 365(dX4). 
Garvin Stryker, Law Offices of Garvin P. 
Stryker, San Antonio, Tex., for debtor. 
David Gragg, Jeffers, Brook, Kreager 
and Gragg, San Antonio, Tex., for City of 
San Antonio. 
William H. Lemons, Cox & Smith Inc., 
San Antonio, Tex., for Nat Bank of Com-
merce. 
R. GLEN AYERS, Jr., Chief Judge. 
Attorneys for the debtor, Garvin Stryker 
of the Law Offices of Garvin Stryker for 
the City of San Antonio, Mr. David Gragg, 
Jeffers, Brook, Kreager and Gragg, for the 
National Bank of Commerce, William Lem-
ons of Cox and Smith. 
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FACTS 
The debtor, Giles Associates, Ltd., filed a 
voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code on January 4, 1988. 
Since that date, the debtor has operated its 
business as a debtor in possession. The 
debtor owns, operates or leases a commer-
cial office building located on Alamo Plaza 
in San Antonio, Texas. In fact, the debtor 
owns one-half of a building immediately 
across the plaza from the Alamol and leas-
es (or leased) one-half of that same building 
from the City of San Antonio. 
The National Bank of Commerce has a 
first lien pursuant to a deed of trust on the 
one-half of the building owned by the debt-
or. The debtor also gave the bank a lien 
on its leasehold interest as additional collat-
eral.2 
Following the date of the petition in 
bankruptcy, the bank tendered several 
rental payments to the City which were 
duly accepted. Unfortunately, neither the 
debtor nor the bank took any action to 
assume the lease between the debtor and 
the City within the sixty day period set 
forth at § 365(d)(4). 
[1] Eventually, the City of San Antonio 
noticed that error and filed a motion seek-
ing to have the lease deemed rejected. In 
an interesting response, premised primarily 
on a decision by Jay Gueck, formerly Unit-
ed States Bankruptcy Judge, District of 
Colorado, the bank alleged that § 365(d)(4) 
did not work a termination of the leasehold 
even if the lease was "deemed rejected" 
under that section. See In re Storage 
Technology Corp., 53 B.R. 471 (Bankr.D. 
Colo. 1985). This Court rejects the reason-
ing of the Colorado opinion and other sim-
ilar opinions cited by the bank and adopts 
the rationale set forth in cases such as In 
re Bernard, 69 B.R. 13 (Bankr.D. Hawaii 
1986), which holds that automatic rejection 
1. No, not across the alley from the Alamo. 
2. This matter will eventually be settled. This 
opinion will only determine whether the Na-
tional Bank of Commerce or the City of San 
Antonio has the whip hand. The case will be 
settled because the entrance to the building is 
located on the leasehold premises while the pub-
lic restrooms are located on the owned premis-
of the lease under § 365(d)(4) terminates a 
lease as to all parties, including creditors. 
The issues are really very simple and 
straightforward. Under § 365(dX4), a 
lease of non-residential real property is 
deemed rejected sixty days after the date 
of a petition in bankruptcy (under Chapter 
11 or any other chapter) unless the trustee 
or debtor-in-possession takes some action 
to preserve the lease, either by filing a 
motion to assume or by filing a motion to 
extend the time for assumption or rejec-
tion. See generally, In re Southwest Air-
craft Services, Inc., 831 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 
1987). If no action is taken, the lease is 
deemed rejected, and the trustee or debtor 
in possession must surrender possession of 
the premises. 
[2] This bankruptcy provision is not af-
fected by separate state law doctrines con-
cerning the termination of leases. Because 
state law does not control this issue, the 
Court need not consider the strong pre-
sumption under state law that there can be 
no implied termination and forfeiture of a 
lease. See, e.g., Wendlandt v. Sommers 
Drug Stores Co., 551 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Civ. 
App.—Austin 1977, writ ref d. n.r.e.). If 
the state law were relevant the doctrine of 
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 99 
S.Ct 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979) would, of 
course, require this Court to look to state 
law. However, here it is very clear that 
the federal policy concerning leases and 
inaction on the part the debtor-lessor clear-
ly supersedes any state law considerations. 
[3] Likewise, the fact that the lease in 
this case required some notice of breach to 
be provided by the City to the debtor-lessee 
is also irrelevant. The lease has not been 
rejected due to any contractual breach by 
the lessee; the lease is deemed rejected as 
a matter of law as set forth in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 
es; the telephone system is located on the 
owned premises while the pump station is locat-
ed on the leased premises; stairwell is located 
in both halves of the premises and both are 
necessary to meet the fire code; the elevator is 
located on the leased premises and the water 
lines are on the owned side. 
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[4] A similar analysis also defeats any 
claim that the City has somehow accepted 
an assumption or other treatment of this 
lease by accepting the rent payments from 
the lienholder, the National Bank of Com-
merce. First, lease assumption is some-
thing more than the acceptance of rental 
payments, as ably set forth in opinions 
such as In re Southwest Aircraft Services, 
Inc., 53 B.R. 805 (Bankr.C.D. Ca.1985), 
rev yd on other grds., 831 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 
1988). Further, assumption of a lease can-
not occur without some pleading being filed 
with the Court. That is quite clear from 
§ 365(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 6006. Final-
ly, § 365(d)(3) makes mandatory the pay-
ment of all sums due under a lease from 
the debtor-lessee to a lessor, irrespective of 
whether or not assumption or rejection oc-
curs. § 365(d)(3) operates independently of 
§ 365(d)(4). The requirement of monthly 
payments is very clear and has nothing to 
do with the issue of assumption or rejec-
tion. See, e.g., In re Southwest Aircraft 
Services, Inc., 53 B.R. 805. 
[5] The security interest held by the 
bank, the existence of which was known to 
the City of San Antonio, cannot be said to 
impose any affirmative duties on the City 
of San Antonio concerning the rights of the 
National Bank of Commerce. To the best 
of this Court's knowledge, there exists no 
such duty on behalf of the City. 
[6] Finally, although the lease may pro-
vide options allowing the debtor or some 
third party lienholder to cure defaults un-
der the lease, it is very clear from these 
facts that no default has occurred under 
the lease. The default is under a separate 
statutory mandate not linked in anyway 
whatsoever to the terms of the lease. 
All of this leads back to In re Storage 
Technology Corp., 53 B.R. 471 (Bankr.D. 
Colo.1985), which must be addressed. Ba-
sically, Judge Gueck's opinion holds that 
rejection of a lease under § 365(dX4) is 
merely a "breach" of the lease. See 
§ 365(g). Since a breach does not termi-
nate a lease—and, since § 365(dX4) does 
not itself use the word "terminate"—Judge 
Gueck ruled that failure to act under 
§ 365(d)(4) did "not have the conclusive ef-
fect of terminating the lease." Id. at 475. 
This analysis would make some sense if 
the Bankruptcy Code at § 365(d)(4) and the 
legislative history of that section were not 
so very clear. First, the legislative history 
of the so-called "shopping center" amend-
ments enacted as part of the 1984 Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship 
Act ("BAFJA"): 
The bill would lessen the problems 
caused by extended vacancies and partial 
operation of tenant space by requiring 
that the trustee decide whether to as-
sume or reject nonresidential real proper-
ty lease within 60 days after the order 
for relief in a case under any chapter. 
This time period could be extended by 
the court for cause, such as m exception-
al cases involving large numbers of leas-
es. One of the minor changes in this 
subtitle was to limit it to nonresidential 
real property leases. If the lease is not 
assumed or rejected within this 60-day 
period, or any additional period granted 
by the court, the lease is deemed rejected 
and the trustee must immediately surren-
der the property to the lessor. 
The acceptance by the lessor of any pay-
ments made by the trustee as required 
by . . . [§ 365(d)(3) ] does not constitute a 
waiver or relinquishment of the lessor's 
rights under such lease or under the 
bankruptcy code. 
130 Cong.Rec. S8894-95 (Daily Ed. June 29, 
1984). 
Further, the statute is clear. Failure to 
act results in first rejection and next in an 
absolute obligation to surrender the prem-
ises: "If the trustee does not assume or 
reject an unexpired lease—, then such 
lease is deemed rejected, and the trustee 
shall immediately surrender such nonresi-
dential real property to the lessor." 
§ 365(dX4). 
To say, as Judge Gueck, that the failure 
to act is merely a "breach" is not consist-
ent with either that statute or its history. 
Why not? Because § 365(dX4) deems that 
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the trustee or debtor has, by failing to act, 
breached the lease and that the breach is so 
serious that immediate surrender is manda-
tory. The breach plus the surrender obli-
gation can only be seen as termination of 
any of the trustee's or debtor's rights in 
the leasehold. Otherwise, the face of the 
statute and its history are meaningless. 
Further, Judge Gueck's reliance upon the 
use of different terms—"rejection", 
"breach", and "termination''—at different 
sections of the Code is not proper. Yes, 
Congress could have and should have used 
consistent terms, but Congressional incon-
sistency creates no presumptions. Cf. In 
re Storage Technology Corp., 53 B.R. at 
474. 
For example, "breach" is equated with 
"rejection" at § 365(g) so as to make post-
petition rejection give rise to a pre-petition 
(non-priority) claim. This section—§ 365(g) 
—does not, therefore, merely define "rejec-
tion" or "breach", although Judge Gueck 
implies as much. Id. at 474. 
Where "termination" is used in the con-
text of a lease, as in § 502(b)(6), Judge 
Gueck is right to say that the term is used 
to limit claims. Id. He stretches to con-
clude, however, that this shows that "[t]he 
drafters of § 365 apparently knew the dif-
ference between breach and termination." 
Id. 
The key to the Gueck analysis is the use 
of "equity", which he says requires protec-
tion of parties in a position similar to that 
of the bank in this case. Id. The "equity" 
done is not permissible. It rewrites the 
Code. The mandate of section 365(d)(4) is 
clear: Act within sixty days or loose pos-
session. 
Failure to act is rejection and a rejected 
lease can never thereafter be assumed or 
rejected in a chapter 11 case. See 
§ 1123(b)(2): "a plan may . . . provide for 
assumption . . . of any . . . lease . . . not 
previously rejected ...". In a chapter 7 
case, the lease cannot be assumed by a 
trustee—at least by implication—since 
§ 365(a) directs the trustee as able to as-
sume or reject. Presumably, while the 
trustee can assume and then reject, under 
§ 365(gX2), the trustee cannot reject and 
then assume, for § 365 makes no provision 
for such a sequence. 
Analysis of the Code, then, clearly shows 
that § 365(d)(4) terminates leases. The 
poor creditor in the position of the bank, 
done in by this provision, is in no worse 
position than a second lienholder faced with 
a § 362 motion for relief where the debtor 
cannot provide adequate protection. The 
bank must act to protect itself. This Court 
does not have a "roving commission to do 
equity." See United States v. Sutton, 786 
F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986). It will not, 
should not, and cannot protect the bank or 
the debtor from the consequences of inac-
tivity, for those consequences are clearly 
mandated by the Code and by Congress. 
An order will be submitted by the City. 
In re Efraim ABRAMOFF and Orah 
Abramoff, Debtors. 
Efraim ABRAMOFF and Orah 
Abramoff, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
GEORGIA, Defendant. 
Bankruptcy No. 5-86-00173-A-ll. 
Adv. No. 87-5290-A. 
United States Bankruptcy Court, 
W.D. Texas, 
San Antonio Division. 
Sept 30, 1988. 
Debtor sought to avoid penalty paid to 
secured creditor prepetition, upon acceler-
ation of note. The Bankruptcy Court, R. 
Glen Ayers, Jr., Chief Judge, held that* (1) 
payment was avoidable as fraudulent 
transfer, and (2) payment was avoidable as 
usurious interest. 
Judgment for debtor. 
IN RE MAXWELL 
Client 40 U.K. 231 (DC. 1984) 
International, Inc., 28 B.R. 324 (Bkrtcy.S. 
D.N.Y.1983). 
Because the Court has determined that 
Manville's insurance is property of the es-
tate under the Code and that actions by 
third parties against the bankrupt's insur-
ers are automatically stayed upon the filing 
of the petition, we need not address GAF's 
contention that the Bankruptcy Court had 
no authority to stay proceedings against 
Manville's insurers pursuant to § 105. 
However, as this Court has observed in 
addressing Lake's appeal, the Court will 
normally have power under § 105 "to en-
join actions excepted from the automatic 
stay which might interfere in the rehabilita-
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James E. MAXWELL, Jr., as Debtor and 
Charles J. Myler, as Trustee, 
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United States District Court, 
N.D. Illinois, E.D. 
Mav 2, 1984. 
The Bankruptcy Court's order of April 
14, 1983 pertaining to the automatic stay, 
and its order of May 23, 1983 granting the 
Debtor's motion to dismiss Lake's April 20, 
1983 complaint, are affirmed, insofar as 
they are sought to be reviewed in the three 
appeals addressed by the Court herein. In 
so doing, this Court reiterates that affirm-
ance of these denials of relief from the stay 
by the Bankruptcy Court is without preju-
dice to future application(s) for complete or 
partial relief from the stays imposed pursu-
ant to § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code and 
the Bankruptcy Court's prior orders, based 
on the circumstances and the equities of 
the case as they may then exist. 
So Ordered. 
Franchisor-lessor appealed from an or-
der of the Bankruptcy Court, 30 B.R. 982, 
Robert L. Eisen, J., denying its motion to 
lift automatic stay. The District Court, 
Moran, J., held that: (1) termination of 
sublease effectively terminated franchise; 
(2) sublease had been terminated before 
debtor filed for bankruptcy; (3) debtor in 
possession's interest in the leasehold was 
not sufficient to revive the terminated 
lease. (4) landlord's acceptance of payment 
for rent after termination did not waive 
termination of the lease; and (5) fran-
chisor-lessor was not estopped to argue 
that the lease had been validly terminated. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Contracts <S=>215(2) 
Termination of sublease would also 
serve to terminate franchise agreement, as-
suming that pretermination procedures for 
the franchise agreement had been followed, 
where the franchise was limited to specific 
premises which were the subject of the 
sublease and the franchise was worthless 
without a location to operate. 
2. Contracts <e=>217 
Where viability of franchise agreement 
rested upon continued existence of sub-
lease, landlord-franchisor's notice of im-
pending termination of sublease and its 
filing of suit in state court clearly advised 
tenant-franchisee of the termination of the 
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relationship between the parties in accord-
ance with the franchise agreement. 
3. Contracts 0=215(1) 
Absent express contractual language, 
court must adopt reasonable construction 
of termination provision in franchise agree-
ment. 
4. Landlord and Tenant 0=94(1), 119(1) 
Under Illinois law, landlord terminated 
lease by sending five-day notice of filing 
suit for possession and, upon expiration of 
the. five-day notice, tenant lost its leasehold 
interest and became a tenant at sufferance. 
5. Bankruptcy 0=255 
Bankruptcy court cannot resurrect a 
lease which has been terminated prior to 
the filing of bankruptcy. 
6. Landlord and Tenant 0=94(1), 288 
In Illinois, statutory notice procedure 
for terminating a lease and a forcible entry 
and detainer action are two distinct things; 
the former process ends a contractual rela-
tionship between the parties while the forc-
ible entry and detainer action determines 
the right to possession of property. 
7. Bankruptcy 0=659(2.2) 
Debtor-tenant in possession has a 
slight equitable interest which is protected 
by the automatic stay. Bankr.Code, 11 
U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1). 
8. Bankruptcy 0=659(2.2) 
As debtor in possession under termi-
nated lease which left it with only a tenan-
cy at sufferance, debtor had limited equita-
ble interest which was protected by auto-
matic stay. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 362(d). 
9. Bankruptcy 0=255 
Fact that automatic stay gives limited 
and temporary protection to holdover ten-
ant-debtor based solely on naked posses-
sion does not mean that there is a viable 
executory contract which a debtor can as-
sume. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 363. 
10. Bankruptcy C=255 
Even if "debtor-franchisee had some 
protectible equitable interest stemming 
from continued occupation of restaurant 
premises, that interest was not sufficient to 
revive a sublease which had previously 
been terminated by the franchisor-landlord 
and that sublease could not be assumed by 
the trustee. 
11. Landlord and Tenant 0=112(2) 
Landlord can waive termination of a 
lease by accepting entire amount of de-
fault. 
12. Landlord and Tenant 0=103(1) 
Partial cure of default by tenant, even 
before expiration of the five-day notice, is 
not sufficient to avoid termination. 
13. Landlord and Tenant o=ll2(2) 
Landlord's acceptance of rent and oth-
er payments from a tenant at sufferance 
does not revive a terminated lease. 
14. Landlord and Tenant 0=196 
Liability for rent continues so long as 
the tenant is in possession. 
15. Bankruptcy 0=673 
Courts will not revive a terminated 
lease simply because of the lease's impor-
tance to the reorganization efforts. 
16. Estoppel o=52.15 
Elements which must be present for 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply 
are: words or conduct by the party against 
whom estoppel is alleged constituting ei-
ther a misrepresentation or concealment of 
material facts; knowledge on part of the 
party against whom estoppel is alleged that 
representations were untrue; party claim-
ing benefit of estoppel must not have 
known the representations to be false ei-
ther at the time they were made or at the 
time they were acted upon; party estopped 
must either intend or expect that his con-
duct or representations will be acted upon 
the party asserting the estoppel; party 
seeking benefit of estoppel must have re-
lied or acted upon the representations; and 
party claiming benefit of the estoppel must 
be in a position of prejudice if the other 
party is permitted to deny the truth of the 
representations which were made. 
17. Kstoppel e=>52.15 
Proof of fraudulent intent is not al-
ways necessary to invoke the doctrine of 
estoppel; although fraud is an essential 
element, it is sufficient that a fraudulent or 
unjust effect results from defendant's con-
duct. 
18. Estoppel <e=>58 
In the absence of any showing that 
franchisee-tenant or trustee were preju-
diced by franchisor-landlord's delay in ad-
vancing its argument that lease had been 
terminated prior to the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition, franchisor-landlord wa$ not 
estopped from making that argument even 
though it had at one time filed a complaint 
requesting the bankruptcy judge to compel 
assumption or rejection of the agreements 
in question. 
James A. Chatz, Michael R. Hassan, Lord 
Bissell & Brook, Chicago, 111., for plaintiff. 
Charles J. Myler, G. Alexander McTav-
ish, Ruddy, Myler, Ruddy & Fabian, Auro-
ra, III., for defendants. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
MORAN, District Judge. 
This is an appeal from a final order en-
tered by the Bankruptcy Court denying 
plaintiff-appellant's motion to lift the auto-
matic stay. The opinion of the bankruptcy 
judge is reported at 30 B.R. 982 (Bkrtcy.N. 
D.111.1983). This court has jurisdiction un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1334. It is plaintiff-appel-
lant's position that the stay should be lifted 
because the sublease and franchise agree-
ment between the parties, which covered a 
Burger King restaurant, had been termi-
nated prior to the date appellee-defendant 
filed its Chapter 11 proceeding. 
I. 
Section 3G5(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 
11 U.S.C. § 365(a), permits the bankruptcy 
trustee to "assume or reject any executory 
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." 
The Co.dfi further provides that: 
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IN KK MAXWKIX 233 
Cite ns 40 U.K. 2JI ( D C . I9K4) 
If there has been a default in an executo-
ry contract or unexpired lease of the 
debtor, the trustee may not assume such 
contract or lease unless, at the time of 
the assumption of such contract or lease, 
the trustee— 
a) cures, or provides adequate assur-
ance that the trustee will promptly 
cure, such default; 
b) compensates, or provides adequate 
assurance that the trustee will prompt-
ly compensate, a party other than the 
debtor to such contract or lease, for 
any actual pecuniary loss to such party 
resulting from such default; and 
c) provides adequate assurance of fur-
ther performance under such contract 
or lease. 
11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1). 
In its April 12, 1983 reorganization plan, 
the trustee proposed to assume the sub-
lease and franchise agreement. Chart 
House, Inc. promptly challenged this 
planned assumption, not on the ground that 
the trustee's assurances were inadequate 
under 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) but, more fun-
damentally, because these agreements had 
been terminated prior to bankruptcy and 
thus were not subject to assumption under 
11 U.S.C. § 365(a). See 2 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy, J 365.02 at 365-13 (15th ed. 1983). 
Chart House and Maxwell had entered 
into a Burger King franchise agreement 
and a sublease at the end of December 
1979. The franchise agreement permitted 
Maxwell to operate a Burger King restau-
rant at a specified location in Elgin, Illinois. 
The sublease covered those premises. 
The provisions for termination of each of 
these agreements are of most importance 
to this case. The applicable language in 
the franchise agreement was as follows: 
[XL] B. Should [Maxwell] suffer an 
occurrence of any of the following 
events, [Chart House], at its option and 
without prejudice to any other rights or 
remedies provided for hereunder, or by 
law or equity, may terminate this license. 
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(2) If franchisee defaults in the pay-
ment of royalties or advertising due 
hereunder or fails to submit profit and 
loss statements or other financial 
statements . . . and fails to cure such 
defaults within thirty (30) days of writ-
ten notification to cure same. 
* * * * * * 
(0) Upon notification of any default 
[Maxwell] agrees to promptly take 
such steps as may be required to cure 
the default and shall diligently pursue 
such curative measures as may be re-
quired and in the event that thirty (30) 
days' time is insufficient then [Max-
well] shall have as much time as may 
be reasonably required to cure same. 
(Franchise Agreement, pp. 36a-37a.) (Em-
phasis added.)l 
The sublease agreement provided in rele-
vant part that: 
If [Maxwell] shall fail to pay any install-
ments of rent promptly on the day when 
the same shall become due and payable 
hereunder, and shall continue in default 
for a period of thirty (30) days after, 
written notice thereof by [Chart House] 
. . . [Chart House] may (a) declare the 
said term ended, and enter into said 
premises demised, or any part thereof, 
either with or without process of law, 
and expel [Maxwell] . . . and so to repos-
sess and enjoy said premises in [Chart 
House's] former estate. 
(Sublease Agreement, p. 58a.) 
Beginning in January of 1982, Maxwell 
failed to make the required advertising and 
royalty payments under the franchise 
agreement, as well as rental payments un-
der the sublease. On April 6, 1982, Chart 
House sent a letter to Maxwell which called 
attention to these defaults, demanded that 
they be promptly cured, and promised that 
Chart House would resort to all of its legal 
remedies if Maxwell had not made payment 
or offered a satisfactory arrangement for 
payment within thirty days. 
Maxwell neither cured the defaults nor 
offered a repayment arrangement. Conse-
quently, on May 7, 1982, Chart House sent 
Maxwell a "Landlord's Five Days' Notice," 
which stated that unless Maxwell paid his 
rent within five days its "lease of said 
premises will be terminated forthwith." 
The notice further demanded immediate 
possession of the premises in the event of 
non-payment. 
Maxwell did not pay his back rent or the 
other monies he owed Chart House, offer a 
repayment plan or relinquish possession of 
the restaurant. On May 14, 1982, Chart 
House brought an action in state court for 
possession of the restaurant and for judg-
ment in the amount of the rent arrearage. 
This action was automatically stayed when 
Maxwell filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 
on May 21, 1982. Maxwell has continued 
to occupy and operate the restaurant since 
he declared bankruptcy. He has not cured 
the defaults but has on occasion made rent-
al, royalty and advertising payments. His 
total indebtedness to Chart House has in-
creased since he filed for bankruptcy. 
II. 
Initially it is necessary to clarify the rela-
tionship between the franchise agreement 
and the sublease. The Bankruptcy Court 
viewed the sublease and the franchise 
agreement as both separate and interde-
pendent, such that the agreements had to 
be terminated simultaneously in order to 
terminate either agreement. The court re-
jected Chart House's argument that the 
sending of the five-day notice to Maxwell 
and the filing of the forcible entry and 
detainer action in state court terminated 
the sublease and were together an affirma-
tive act which terminated the franchise 
agreement. This approach was in error. 
Certainly the two agreements are closely 
interdependent. The franchise agreement 
is limited to the specific premises which are 
the subject of the sublease. As Maxwell 
points out, termination of the sublease 
leaves the franchisee with a franchise that 
is worthless because there is no place to 
I. Page numbers refer to the appendix lo Chart House's brief. 
operate it. In addition, the 
obligation to make royalty and advertising 
payments is based upon the volume of its 
sales. Clearly, termination of the sublease 
means no sales by franchisee and thus ren-
ders the franchise agreement nugatory. In 
light of this interdependence, Maxwell ar-
gues that so long as the franchise agree-
ment is in effect, the continuing existence 
of the sublease must be implied. 
[1] A better view is that because of the 
functional interdependence of these two 
contracts, termination of the sublease 
would also serve to terminate the franchise 
agreement, assuming that the pretermina-
tion procedures for the franchise agree-
ment had been followed. Here Chart 
House followed these pretermination proce-
dures. Its April 6 letter expressly advised 
Maxwell of the default under the franchise 
agreement. Maxwell neither cured the de-
fault nor made a diligent effort to do so 
within thirty days. 
[2] The bankruptcy judge was correct 
in deciding that the franchise agreement 
did not lapse automatically after these thir-
ty days had elapsed. Rather, at the expira-
tion of the thirty days Chart House could 
terminate the franchise agreement "at its 
option"' (Franchise Agreement XI-B). 
Since the viability of the franchise agree-
ment so obviously rested upon the contin-
ued existence of the sublease, Chart 
House's five-day notice of the impending 
termination of the sublease and its filing of 
suit in state court clearly advised Maxwell 
of Chart House's termination of the rela-
tionship between the parties. 
[3] It is instructive that the franchise 
agreement does not specify either the form 
or the content of the affirmative act neces-
sary to exercise the option of terminating 
the agreement. Absent express contractu-
al language, this court must adopt a rea-
sonable construction of the termination 
provision in the franchise agreement. A 
requirement that Chart House could only 
terminate the sublease or the franchise 
agreement by simultaneous termination of 
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franchisee's both agreements, through the use of essen-
tially duplicative notice procedures, exalts 
form over substance and ignores the inevi-
table negation of the franchise agreement 
occasioned by the termination of the sub-
lease. 
III. 
The issue thus becomes whether the sub-
lease had been terminated before Maxwell 
filed for bankruptcy. If the sublease and 
the franchise agreement are interdepen-
dent and their termination procedures are 
interrelated, as outlined above, a finding 
that the sublease had been terminated will 
permit the lifting of the stay and prevent 
the trustee from assuming the agreements. 
Alternatively, if the two agreements are 
independently terminable, a finding that 
the sublease had been terminated will have 
the same effect. If the stay is lifted on the 
sublease alone and Chart House dispossess-
es Maxwell from the site, the franchise 
agreement will be of no use to the trustee 
for the reasons set out above. 
The five-day notice which Chart House 
sent to Maxwell conformed to the statutory 
notice requirement: 
[A] landlord or his agent may, at any 
time after rent is due, demand payment 
thereof and notify the tenant, in writing, 
that unless payment is made within a 
time mentioned in such notice, not less 
than five days after service thereof, the 
lease will be terminated. If the tenant 
shall not within the time mentioned in 
such notice, pay the rent due, the land-
lord may consider the lease ended and 
sue for possession . . . . 
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 80, § 8 (repealed as of July 
1, 1982) (emphasis added).2 When Maxwell 
made no response to this notice Chart 
House filed an action for possession and 
back rent in state court. The court had yet 
to enter judgment when the automatic stay 
was imposed. Because the bankruptcy 
judge believed that the sublease and the 
franchise agreement were interrelated and 
had to be terminated separately and simul-
2. Section 8 has been rccnactcd as III.Kc\.Slni. th. 110, $ 9-209. 
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taneously, a finding that the sublease had 
been terminated would have been of no 
consequence to his decision not to lift the 
stay since he had decided that the franchise 
agreement remained in effect. He never-
theless held that in light of the absence of 
a judgment on Chart House's suit for forci-
ble entry and detainer, the sublease had 
not been terminated for purposes of the 
bankruptcy proceeding. The judge cited 
with approval Executive Square Office 
Building v. O'Connor & Associates, Inc., 
19 B.R. 143 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1981). That 
court held that even leases terminated be-
cause of the tenant's default could be as-
sumed by the bankruptcy trustee so long 
as the tenant had declared bankruptcy pri-
or to the conclusion of statutorily-pre-
scribed judicial eviction proceedings for a 
judgment of possession. Id. at 146-43. 
[4] Putting aside for a moment the ef-
fect of bankruptcy proceedings, it is clear 
under Illinois law that by sending the five-
day notice and by filing a suit for posses-
sion, Chart House terminated the sublease. 
See Woods v. Soucy. 166 111. 407, 47 N.E. 
67 (1897); Elizondo v. Medina, 100 111. 
App.3d 718, 56 Ill.Dec. 301, 303, 427 N\E.2d 
381, 383 (1st Dist.1981); Elizondo v. Perez, 
42 Ill.App.3d 313, 1 Ill.Dec. 112, 113, 356 
N.E.2d 112, 113 (1st Dist.1976); Wester-
man v. Gilmore, 17 Ill.App.2d 455, 150 
N.E.2d 660, 662-63 (3d Dist.1958); Juhasz 
v. Haisan, 337 Ill.App. 387, 85 N.E.2d 856 
(1st Dist.1949); Stromberg v. Western 
Telephone Co., $6 Ill.App. 270 (1899). Illi-
nois courts have interpreted the clause in 
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 80, § 8, that "[i]f the ten-
ant shall not within the time mentioned in 
such notice, pay the rent due, the landlord 
may consider the lease ended," to mean 
what it says. Leases in Illinois are termi-
nated five days after the tenant's receipt of 
the statutory notice, provided the tenant 
does not cure the default. Upon the expi-
ration of the five-day notice Maxwell lost 
its leasehold interest and became a tenant 
at sufferance. This occurred by May 14, 
1982, well before- Maxwell declared bank-
ruptcy. 
IV. 
f5] It has been conclusively established 
that a bankruptcy court cannot resurrect a 
lease that has been terminated prior to the 
filing of bankruptcy. In re Foxfire Inn of 
Stuart Florida Inc., 30 B.R. 30, 31-32 
(Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1983); Matter of DcPoy, 29 
B.R. 466, 470 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ind.1983); In re 
Pagoda International, Inc., 26 B.R. 18, 21 
(Bkrtcy.D.Md.1982); In re Darwin, 22 B.R. 
259, 263 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y.1982); In re Fi-
delity American Mortgage Co., 19 B.R. 
568, 573 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.1982); In re Victo-
ry Pipe Craftsmen, Inc., 8 B.R. 635, 637 
(Bkrtcy.N-D.Ill.19Sl) (Eisen, J.); Matter of 
R.R.S., Inc., 7 B.R. S70, 872-73 (Bkrtcy.M. 
D.Fla.1980); In re Aries Enterprises, Ltd., 
3 B.R. 472, 475-76 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1980). See 
also Matter of Commodity Merchants, 
Inc., 53S F.2d 1260, 1262 (7th Cir.1976) 
(Section 70(b) of Bankruptcy Act); cf. Mat-
ter of Sew Media Irjax, Inc., 19 B.R. 199, 
200-01 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1982) (contract for 
goods). Leases terminated before bank-
ruptcy are simply not assumable by the 
trustee. 
' The bankruptcy judge here, relying on 
Executive Square, supra, nevertheless 
treated the sublease as "property of the 
estate" subject to the automatic stay provi-
sions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) and (3) and 
assumable by the trustee. What was deci-
sive for the judge, as for the court in 
Executive Square, was that the state court 
had not rendered judgment on Chart 
House's forcible entry and detainer action. 
The judge reasoned that since this proceed-
ing offered Maxwell an opportunity to re-
sort to equity in order to prevent termina-
tion of the lease, the lease had not expired 
for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). This 
was in error. 
[6] In some states it is necessary for 
the landlord to obtain a judgment for pos-
session in order to terminate a lease. See 
e.g., In re Fontaineblcau Hotel Corp., 515 
F.2d 913 (5th Cir.1975) (Louisiana law). 
The bankruptcy judge offered no support 
for the proposition that Illinois is one of 
these states and this court has found no 
such support. In Illinois the statutory no-
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tice procedure for terminating a lease and 
a forcible entry and detainer action are two 
distinct things. The former process ends 
the contractual relationship between the 
parties while the forcible entry and detain-
er action determines rights to possession of 
property. The bankruptcy court confused 
the two actions. Executive Square has 
been persuasively criticized on the same 
ground. See In re Foxfire Inn of Stuart 
Florida, Inc., supra, 30 B.R. at 31 (Execu-
tive Squai'e "confused expiration or termi-
nation of lease with physical repossession 
of the leased premises"). The conclusion 
of the Foxfire court is equally applicable to 
this case: 
[T]he termination before bankruptcy of a 
lease pursuant to its terms and applica-
ble State law results in its expiration, 
even if, as is the case here, the tenant 
remains in possession as a tenant at suf-
ferance and the landlord has instituted 
but not yet concluded an eviction pro-
ceeding. 
Id. at 31. 
[7] The property of a bankrupt's estate 
consists of "all legal or equitable interests 
of the debtor in property as of the com-
mencement of the case." 11 U.S. 
§ 541(a)(1). Courts have recognized that a 
debtor-tenant in possession does have a 
slight equitable interest under § 541 which 
is protected by the automatic stay. See In 
re Darwin, supra, 22 B.R. at 264-65; Mat-
ter of Ruby's Florida, 11 B.R. 171, 174-75 
(Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1981); In re GSVC Res-
taurant Corp., 10 B.R. 300, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980); Matter of R.R.S. Inc., supra, 7 B.R. 
at 872-83 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1980); In re An-
dorra Meat Market, Inc., 7 B.R. 744, 745-
46 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.1980); In re Mimi's of 
Atlanta, Inc., 5 B.R. 623, 627 (Bkrtcy.N.D. 
Ga.1980), affd, 11 B.R. 710 (D.C.N.D.Ga. 
1981). The automatic stay gives only limit-
ed and temporary protection to this equita-
ble interest. It will be lifted "for cause" in 
light of the debtor's inability to satisfy the 
requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), In re 
Darwin, supra, 22 B.R., at 264-65 (Bkrtcy. 
E.D.N.Y.1982), In re Andorra Meat Mar-
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kct, Inc., supra. 7 B.R. at 746, or when the 
debtor can show no basis in equity for its 
continuance, In re Foxfire Inn of Stuart 
Florida, Inc., supra, 30 B.R. at 31-32. 
[8] As a debtor in possession, under a 
terminated lease which left it with only a 
tenancy at sufferance, Maxwell held this 
limited equitable interest which was pro-
tected by the automatic stay. It is not 
necessary to the disposition of this case to 
determine whether this interest has since 
lapsed or whether the automatic stay could 
have been lifted for cause under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(d). Nevertheless, the court notes 
that for many months after he declared 
bankruptcy Maxwell apparently had made 
little or no effort to prepare a plan to pay 
off his debts and the amount of his debt to 
Chart House rose during the post-bank-
ruptcy period. 
[9] What is crucial to the outcome of 
this case is that the presence of a limited 
equitable interest held by a debtor in pos-
session has no bearing whatsoever on the 
issue of the assumability of the terminated 
lease. "The fact that the automatic stay 
gives limited and temporary protection to a 
holdover tenant-debtor, based solely on 
naked possession, does not mean that there 
is a viable executory contract which a debt-
or can assume under Sec. 363 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code." Matter of R.R.S. Inc., su-
pra, 7 B.R. at 872. See also In re Foxfire 
Inn, supra; In re Darwin, supra; Matter 
of Ruby's Florida, supra; In re Andorra 
Meat Market, supra. The use of the auto-
matic stay to protect the limited interest of 
the tenant in possession has absolutely no 
bearing on the continued viability of the 
lease. "Once a lease is terminated prior to 
the intervention of bankruptcy, the land-
lord-tenant relationship is gone regardless 
of the protection of the right of posses-
sion." Matter of R.R.S., supra, 7 B.R. at 
873. The separateness of the questions of 
the assumability of the lease and of the 
existence of a limited equitable interest 
based on the debtor's continued possession 
of property mirrors the differences be-
tween the process for terminating a lease 
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and the adjudication of possesMnv lights in 
i wrongful entiy and detainer action 
[10] The I ele\ ance of these pi inciplc& to 
the case at hand is cleai E\en if Maxwell 
has oi had some piotectihle equitable intei 
est stemming from his continued occupa 
tion of the testauiant premises, this intei 
est is not suificient to ie\i\e the teiminat 
ed sublease Because Chait House had 
pioperlv teiminated the sublease pnor to 
Maxwell's declaiation of bankiuptc\ the 
sublease cannot be assumed In the tiustee 
\ I 
The bankrupts judge identified two eq 
uitable factois in suppoit of his conclusion 
The iirst is that Chait House waited foi 
almost a \ear to assert that the sublease 
and the fianchise agieements had been tei 
mmated and should therebv be estopped 
fiom making thu> aigument The second 
factoi that he identified is that the two 
agieements aie Maxwell's onh assets and 
neces:>aul\ bene as the basis of the tius 
tee s reoiganization plan On appeal, Max 
well ad\ances a thud equitable factoi 
w Inch it argues should prompt the com t to 
find that the two agreements aie assuma 
ble, namely, that Maxwell has paid and 
Chait House has accepted payments for 
Maxwell's continued operation of the res-
taurant since it declared bankruptcy 
[11-11] A landlord can waive termina-
tion of a lease by accepting the entue 
amount of the default Bismarck Hotel 
Co i Sutherland, 92 III App 3d 167, 47 
111 Dec 512, 516, 415 N E 2d 517, 521 (1st 
Dist 1980) \ par t i J cure of the default by 
the tenant, e\en before the expiration of 
the fi\e-day notice, is not sufficient to 
avoid termination See Chapman v Wool-
sey, 4 111 App 2d 261, 124 N E 2d 366, 368 
(4th Dist 1955), see also Elizondo v Medi-
na, 100 111 App 3d 718, 56 111 Dec 301, 302, 
427 N E 2d 3S1, 382 (1st Dist 1981), Lehn-
dotffUSA Ltd v Cousins Club, Inc, 40 
111 App 3d 875, 353 N E 2d 171, 175-76 (1st 
Dist 197b) Here it is undisputed that Max-
well has ne\ei £\en partialh cured the 
defaults which prompted Chait House's 
termination effoits The pa>ments which 
it did make to Chait House related to its 
continued occupation <\nd operation of the 
lestauiant A landlord's acceptance of 
lent MK\ other payments from a tenant at 
sufferance does not reu\e a terminated 
lease It is well established that liability 
for rent continues so long as the tenant is 
in possession Jack Spang, Inc v Little, 
50 III 2d 351, 280 N E 2d 208, 213 (1972) 
Consequently, by accepting these pa* ments 
Chait House did not wai\e its termination 
of the sublease 
[15] The bankruptcy judge s reliance on 
the importance of the sublease and the 
franchise agreement to the reorganization, 
is misplaced Courts will not revive a ter 
mmated lease simply because of the lease s 
importance to the reorganization efforts 
The statement of the court in In ye Fidcli 
ty Mortgage Company, supra, is t>pical 
The trustee contends, however, that we 
should consider the equities of the in-
stant case—namelv, that the property in 
question is important to the successful 
reorganization of the debtors—and thus 
deny the lehef requested b> the bank 
Although such considerations are impor 
tant in determining whether relief from 
the automatic stay should be granted, we 
conclude that they are irrelevant in de-
termining whether the debtors have an\ 
interest in the property so that the pro-
tection of the automatic stay is available 
Where the debtor has lost all interest in 
the property prior to the filing of a peti-
tion under the Code, we conclude that we 
should not rely on equitable considera 
tions to revive the debtor's interest and 
to make the automatic stay provisions 
applicable 
19 B R at 573 (footnote omitted) See also 
Matte? of DePoy, supra, 29 BR. at 470, 
In ?e Damin, sup?a9 22 B R at 263, In le 
Victoiy Pipe Craftsmen, Inc, supra, 8 
BR at 637, In ie Chuck Wagon Bar-B-
Que Inc, 7 B R 92, 95 (Bkrtcy D C 1980) 
The bankruptcy judge's position that 
Chart House is equitably estopped from 
asserting that the agreements were termi-
nated is peihaps the strongest of the three 
IN RK MAXWKl.L 
fi le as 40 U.K. 231 (D.C. HS4) 
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factors identified. After its suit for pos-
session of the premises was stayed, Chart 
House filed a complaint requesting the 
bankruptcy judge to compel assumption or 
rejection of the agreements in question. In 
apparent reliance upon Chart House's fail-
ure to assert that the agreements were 
terminated, the trustee devised a reorgani-
zation plan. It is only after the trustee 
filed his plan, which called for the sale of 
the business rather than its return to Chart 
House, that Chart House amended its com-
plaint to assert that the agreements had 
been terminated prior to bankruptcy. 
[16] Equitable estoppel is defined as 
"the effect of voluntary conduct of a party 
whereby he is precluded from asserting 
rights which might otherwise have existed 
against another party who has, in good 
faith, relied upon such conduct and has 
been led thereby to change his position for 
the worse." Gary-Whcaton Bank v. Burt. 
104 Ill.App.3d 767, 60 Ill.Dec. 518, 527, 433 
N.E.2d 315, 324 (2d Dist.l9S2). As stated 
in Stewart v. O'Bnjan, 50 Ill.App.3d 108, S 
Ill.Dec. 633, 365 N.E.2d 1019 (4th Dist. 
1977). the six elements which must be 
present for the doctrine of equitable estop-
pel to apply are: 
(1) words or conduct by the party 
against whom estoppel is alleged consti-
tuting either a misrepresentation or con-
cealment of material facts; (2) knowl-
edge on the part of the party against 
whom the estoppel is alleged that repre-
sentations made were untrue; (3) the 
party claiming the benefit of the estoppel 
must have not known the representations 
to be false either at the time they were 
made or at the time they were acted 
upon; (4) the party estopped must either 
intend or expect that his conduct or rep-
resentations will be acted upon by the 
party asserting the estoppel; (5) the par-
ty seeking the benefit of the estoppel 
must have relied or acted upon the repre-
sentations; and (6) the party claiming the 
benefit of the estoppel must be in a posi-
tion of prejudice if the party against 
'whom the estoppel is alleged is permitted 
to deny the truth of the representations 
made. 
S Ill.Dec. at 634-35, id. at 1020-21. 
[17] Proof of fraudulent intent is not 
always necessary to invoke the estoppel 
doctrine. Although fraud is an essential 
element, it is sufficient that a fraudulent or 
unjust effect results from the defendant's 
conduct. Cessna v. Montgomery, 63 111.2d 
71, SG, 344 N.E.2d 447, 454 (1976). Wheth-
er estoppel should be applied in a given 
case must be determined from the particu-
lar circumstances. Tyska by Tyska v. 
Board of Education, 117 Ul.App.3d 917, 73 
Ill.Dec. 209, 221, 453 N.E.2d 1344, 1356 (1st 
Dist.1983). 
[IS] The elements necessary for equita-
ble estoppel are not present here. There is 
no indication that Chart House's failure to 
actively pursue from the start its claim 
that the agreements were terminated, or 
any representations it made to the trustee, 
were designed to mislead or defraud Max-
well or the trustee. Nothing prevented the 
trustee from concluding—as was evident 
under Illinois law—that at a minimum the 
sublease had been validly terminated. 
More fundamentally, there is no proof that 
either Maxwell or the trustee were preju-
diced by Chart House's delay in advancing 
its termination argument. Whether or not 
the agreements are assumed by the trustee 
appears to be of little concern to Maxwell. 
He will lose the restaurant in any event. 
The trustee admittedly will not see his reor-
ganization plan come to fruition. This does 
not amount to legally-cognizable prejudice 
or detriment sufficient to invoke the estop-
pel doctrine, especially where other requi-
sites are absent, or sufficient to resurrect 
the terminated agreements directly. 
It appears from the limited record that 
Chart House has throughout these proceed-
ings sought to regain possession of the 
restaurant. While its failure to promptly 
argue that the sublease and the franchise 
agreement had been terminated before 
bankruptcy, appears, in retrospect, to have 
been an unfortunate choice of legal tactics, 
no "fraudulent or unjust effect," Cessna, 
supra, 344 N.E.2d 447, at 454, has resulted 
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from its conduct. Consequently, in the ab-
sence of any other compelling equitable 
factors, Chart House is not precluded from 
asserting that the agreements were termi-
nated. 
Conclusion 
The franchise agreement and the sub-
lease should have been read together such 
that the termination of the sublease would 
effectively terminate the franchise agree-
ment. Chart House had terminated the 
sublease prior to Maxwell filing his Chap-
ter 11 petition. Xo equitable factors justi-
fy resurrecting the sublease or precluding 
Chart House from arguing that the fran-
chise agreement and sublease had been ter-
minated. Consequently, the lease and the 
franchise agreement are not assumable by 
the trustee and the bankruptcy court 
should have lifted the automatic stay. 
The decision of the bankruptcy court is 
reversed. This case is remanded to that 
court for further proceedings not inconsist-
ent with this opinion. 
In re Jorge L. Cebollero SANTINI and 
Marta T. Martir Cruz (a/k/a Marta 
Luisa) d/b/a Super Muebieria Cebolle-
ro, Debtors-Appellants. 
Civ. No. S3-1229CC. 
United States District Court, 
D. Puerto Rico. 
May 11, 1984. 
On appeal from a bankruptcy court 
court order denying motion to alter, amend 
or reconsider order denying request for 
extraordinary remedy, the District Court, 
Cerezo, J., held that although bankruptcy 
court perhaps haxLpower to issue requested 
stay of foreclosure proceedings, no valid 
reasons were shown to reverse prior deci-
sion denying relief, and practical effect of 
granting relief sought would have been to 
set aside judgment which was final and 
correctly decided, and where foreclosure 
judgment was executed and debtors failed 
to appeal such judgment, granting of extra-
ordinary request would be futile. 
Appeai dismissed. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <£=2647 
Although movant's choice of words for 
title of motion would appear to place it 
under rule authorizing the opening of judg-
ment on motion for new trial and direction 
of entry of new judgment, same could not 
properly be considered as such where it 
sought reconsideration of order, and not of 
judgment, and where there had been no 
judgment entered regarding order sought 
to be reconsidered. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
Rules 59, 60, 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Courts C=*657, 763 
Rule authorizing motion for relief from 
final judgment does not interrupt period to 
appeal order or judgment from which relief 
is sought, and appeal from order denying 
such motion calls for review only of order 
of denial itself, and not of the underlying 
judgment. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 60, 28 
U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <£=2647 
Rule authorizing relief from final judg-
ment is not substitute for appeal, and mo-
tions based on it that seek only to attack 
allegedly erroneous judgment that was not 
appealed are generally disfavored. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 60(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
4. Bankruptcy <s=217.2 
Although bankruptcy court perhaps 
had power to issue requested stay of fore-
closure proceedings, no valid reasons were 
shown to reverse decision denying such 
relief, and practical effect of granting re-
lief sought would have been to set aside 
judgment which was final and correctly 
decided, and where foreclosure judgment 
was executed and debtors failed to appeal 
such judgment, granting of extraordinary 
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DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN, #2329 
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER, 
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ' 
SYDNEY SEFTEL AND MIKE LANDES, 
aka MICHAEL S. LANDES, ] 
Defendants. ' 
) JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C85-7 821 
(Judge John A. Rokich) 
This case came on for trial on February 9th and 10th, 1989. 
Planitiff was present through its general partner, Richard S. 
Skankey, and was represented by its counsel, Douglas G. 
Mortensen. Defendant Sydney Seftel was not present, having filed 
bankruptcy during the pendency of this action prior to trial. 
Defendant Michael S. Landes was also absent, but was represented 
by his counsel, Daniel W. Jackson. The Court heard the testimony 
of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence, heard and considered 
oral argument and took the matter under advisement. Based on all 
of the evidence and all of the memoranda and other written 
arguments submitted herein, and further based on the Court's 
MAY 2 b 1388 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered herein, 
and good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
Plaintiff Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. be and the same 
is hereby awarded Judgment against Defendant Mike Landes, aka 
Michael S. Landes, in the principal amount of $15,000.00 for 
restoration damages, together with interest thereon at the rate of 
ten percent per annum from June 7, 19 86, amounting to $4, 37 5.^0 0; 
$75,000.00 for loss of rental damages, together with interest at 
the rate of ten percent per annum on accruing $3,126.16 per month 
portions thereof from June 7, 19 85 through June 1, 19 87, amounting 
to £22,815.00; plus attorneys fees in the amount of $16,667.00, 
plus costs in the amount of $782.51, as set forth in Plaintiff !s 
Attorney's Fee Affidavit (Exhibit P-31), for a total Judgment in 
the amount of $134,639.51, which judgment shall bear interest from 
the date hereof at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per. annum. 
Dated this
 N .,' day of May, 19 89. 
By the Court: 
John' A. Rokich 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorney for Defendant Michael S. Landes 
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DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN, #2329 
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER, 
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SYDNEY SEFTEL AND MIKE LANDES, aka ' 
MICHAEL S. LANDES, ] 
Defendants. A 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C85-7 821 
(Judge John A. Rokich) 
This case came on for trial on February 9th and 10thf 19 89. 
Planiuiff was present through its general partner, Richard S. 
Skankey, and was represented by its counsel, Douglas G. 
Morter.sen. Defendant Sydney Seftel was not present, having filed 
bankruptcy during the pendency of this action prior to trial. 
Defendant Michael S. Landes was also absent, but was represented 
by his counsel, Daniel W. Jackson. The Court heard the testimony 
of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence, heard and considered 
oral argument and took the matter under advisement. Having 
considered all of the evidence and all of the memoranda and other 
c w ^ e COUNT/ 
LSDU'j v .c» 
written submissions, and good cause appearing, the Court now 
enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Several months prior to trial, Defendant Landes filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed 
a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The issues presented by 
these motions were intensively and extensively briefed and 
argued. On November 14, 19 88, this Court denied Cefendant Landes1 
Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, expressly finding Defendant Landes to be 
a guarantor of the obligations of Bagel Nosh Holding Corp. under 
the December 29, 197 8 Lease Agreement covering the subject 
premises in the Olympus Hills Shopping Center located at 3923 
Wasatch Boulevard, Holladay, Utah. The Court ruled that the trial 
would be limited to the question of the amount of Defendant 
Landes' liability for rent and other charges accruing under the 
Bagel Nosh Lease. 
2. Plaintiff and Bagel Nosh Holding Corp. entered into a 
Lease Agreement for a twenty year term on December 29, 197 8. 
3. On July 15, 1981, Plaintiff and Bagel Nosh Holding Corp. 
executed a document entitled First Amendment to Lease. This 
document provided for a guarantee of the Lease. Defendants Seftel 
and Landes executed the First Amendment to Lease as guarantors of 
the Lease, as amended. In signing the First Amendment to Lease, 
Defendants Seftel and Landes personally guaranteed the terms of 
-2-
the amended Lease. The First Amendment to Lease refers to a 
separate "guarantee11 set forth as Exhibit "C!! to the First 
Amendment to Lease. Neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant Landes 
was able to produce the "Exhibit CIS at trial. 
4. Plaintiff initiated legal action against Defendants 
Landes and Seftel in 19 84 and obtained judgments against them in 
the sums of $30,710.70 and $5,457.93, respectively, for past-due 
rent and other sums due. That action was Case No. C84-4255. 
5. The judgments entered in C84-4255 were satisfied by the 
Defendants. 
6. The Defendants did not take an appeal from either of the 
judgments entered in C84-4255. They later contended in this case 
that those judgments were non-appealable because all claims 
against all of the parties were not adjudicated in Case No. C84-
4255. 
7. This Court found that the Defendants precluded themselves 
from taking an appeal from said judgments by paying and satisfying 
such judgments and not ever raising the appealability issue until 
this proceeding. 
8. Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. filed for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. 
9. The bankrupt company was doing business as Bagel Nosh 
Olympus Hills. 
10. The exact date that Bagel Nosh vacated the Olympus Hills 
premises is unknown. 
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11. The tenant, Bagel Nosh, discontinued doing business in 
the leased premises, but allowed items of its personal property to 
remain in and upon the premises for some time after it ceased 
actively conducting business there. 
12. Plaintiff re-entered the leased premises in June of 1986 
for the purpose of attempting to relet the premises. 
13. The premises were not restored to the original condition, 
reasonable wear and tear excepted. 
14. Plaintiff attempted to relet the premises, but refused to 
relet for a short term or to a "mom and pop" operation. 
15. Plaintiff had opportunities to lease the premises for a 
short term such as three years to a "mom and pop" operation, but 
the prospective "mom and pop" tenants did not meet Plaintiff's 
criteria. 
16. The Lease Agreement provides for attorneys fees to be 
awarded to the successful party in an action filed in relation to 
the Lease. 
17. The Court, despite its previous ruling not to allow 
Defendant to raise defenses which were or could have been raised 
in Case No C84-4255, did allow Defendants to raise certain of such 
defenses and present evidence in support thereof. 
18. The Plaintiff is entitled to $15,000 for damages to 
restore the premises, together with interest thereon at the rate 
of ten percent per annum from June 7, 1986. 
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19. Plaintiff is entitled to $75,000 in damages for loss of 
rentals from June 7, 1985 through June 7, 1987 at the rate of 
$3,126.16 per month, together with interest on the accruing amount 
thereof at the rate of ten percent per annum. The total 
prejudgment interest on this element of damage through May, 19 89 
is $22,815.00. 
20. Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees of $16,667, 
together with its costs incurred in this action. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff had a valid and existing Lease with Bagel Nosh 
Holding Corp. 
2. Defendant Landes and Seftel guaranteed the Tenant's 
performance of the terms and conditions of the Lease. 
3. Neither the filing of the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
proceeding by Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., dba Bagel Nosh 
Olympus Hills, nor Bagel Nosh's subsequent "rejection" of the 
Lease terminated the Lease. 
4. The Bagel Nosh bankruptcy proceedings did not affect the 
obligations of the non-bankrupt guarantor or guarantors. 
5. The Plaintiff did not use its best efforts to relet the 
premises. 
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6. The Plaintiff is entitled to $15,000 for damages to 
restore the premises, together with interest thereon at the rate 
of ten percent per annum from June 7, 19 86. 
7. Plaintiff is entitled to $75,000 in damages for loss of 
rentals from June 7, 1985 through June 7, 1987 at the rate of 
$3,126.16 per month, together with interest on the accruing amount 
thereof at the rate of ten percent per annum. The total 
prejudgment interest on this element of dair.age through May, 1989 
is $22,815.00 
8. Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees of $16,667, 
together with its costs incurred in this action. 
Dated this ^ ^ day of May, 1989. 
By the Court: 
John A. Rokich 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorney for Defendant Michael S. Landes 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER, 




SIDNEY SEFTEL and MIKE LANDES, 
aka MICHAEL S. LANDES, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-85-7821 
This case came on for trial on February 9, 1989. Plaintiff 
was present and represented by Douglas G. Mortensen. Defendant 
was not present, but represented by Daniel W. Jackson. The Court 
heard the testimony of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence, 
heard oral argument, and took the matter under advisement. 
The Court having reviewed its notes and the Memoranda filed, 
now enters its ruling. 
The Court finds as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and Bagel Nosh Holding Corp. entered into a 
lease agreement for a 20 year term on the 29th day of December, 
1978. 
2. On July 15, 1981, plaintiff and Bagel Nosh Holding 
Corp. executed a document entitled First Amendment to Lease. 
OLYMPUS V. SEFTEL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
3. The First Amendment to Lease also provided for a 
guarantee of the lease. 
4. The defendants Sidney Seftel and Mike Landes executed 
the First Amendment to the Lease agreement as guarantors. 
5. Defendants personally guaranteed the terms of the 
amended lease, the terms of which guarantee are set forth in 
Exhibit C which was made part of the First Amendment to the 
Lease. 
6. Plaintiff nor defendant were able to produce the 
original or copy of Exhibit C at the time of trial. 
7. That plaintiffs initiated legal action against the 
defendants in 1984 and obtained Judgments against the defendants 
in the sums of $30,710.70 and $5,457.93 for past due rent - Case 
No. C-84-4255. 
8. The defendants satisfied the Judgments. 
9. The defendants did not take an appeal from either 
Judgment, but contended that the Judgments were non-appealable 
because all claims against all of the parties were not 
adjudicated in Case No. C-84-4255. 
10. The Court found that the defendants precluded 
themselves from taking an appeal from said Judgments because they 
satisfied the same and did not ever raise the issue until these 
proceedings. 
OLYMPUS V, SEFTEL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
11. Bagel Nosh Intermountain Ltd. filed for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the U. S. Bankruptcy Court. 
12. The bankrupt company was doing business as Bagel Nosh 
Olympus Hills. 
13. The exact date that Bagel Nosh vacated the premises is 
unknown. 
14. The tenant Bagel Nosh discontinued doing business in 
the leased premises, but allowed items of its personal property 
to remain in and upon the premises. 
15. Plaintiff re-entered the leased premises in June of 
1986 for the purpose of attempting to relet the premises. 
16. The lease premises were not restored to the original 
condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted. 
17. Plaintiff attempted to relet the premises, but refused 
to relet for a short term or to a "morn and pop" operation. 
18. Plaintiff did have opportunities to lease the premises 
for three years to a "mom and pop" operation, but these tenants 
did not meet plaintiff's criteria. 
19. The lease agreement provided for attorney fees to be 
awarded to the successful party if an action were filed in 
relation to the lease. 
20. The Court, despite its previous rulings not to allow 
defendant to raise certain defenses to this action, did allow 
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defendants to raise the defenses and present evidence in support 
thereof. 
CONCLUSIONS 
!• Plaintiff had a valid and existing lease with Bagel 
Nosh Holding Corp. 
2. Defendants guaranteed the terms and conditions of the 
lease. 
3. The filing of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding by 
Bagel Nosh Intermountain Ltd., dba Bagel Nosh Olympus Hills did 
not terminate the lease. 
4. The bankruptcy proceedings did not affect the 
obligations of the non-bankrupt guarantors, defendants. 
5. The plaintiff did not use its best efforts to relet the 
premises. 
6. The plaintiff is entitled to $15,000.00 for damages to 
restore the premises, and interest from June 7, 1986. 
7. The plaintiff is entitled to $75,000.00 damages for 
loss of rentals, together with interest from June 7, 198 6. 
8. Plaintiff is awarded $16,667.00 as attorney fees, 
together with its costs. 
9. Plaintiff's counsel shall prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment in accordance with this 
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Memorandum Decision. This Memorandum does not purport to cover 
all of the findings that could be made in this case. 
Dated this -3 7 day of March, 1989. 
/ 
/ 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this z I day of March, 1989: 
Douglas G. Mortensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorney for Defendants 
175 S. Main, Suite 560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN #2329 
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER, 
a Utah Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL and MIKE LANDES, 
aka MICHAEL S. LANDES, 
Defendants. 
LTD. , ) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 
) LANDES* MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
1 JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO STRI 
) AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
1 MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C85-7821 
(Judge John A. Rokich) 
Defendant Mike Landes' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came on regularly 
for hearing before the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge of the 
above-entitled Court on Monday, September 19, 1988 at 2:30 P.M. 
Douglas G. Mortensen appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Olympus 
Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. Daniel W. Jackson appeared on behalf 
of Defendant Mike Landes, aka Michael S. Landes. The Court read 
and considered the memoranda, exhibits and affidavits submitted 
on behalf of the litigants and heard the arguments of counsel. 
The Court also read Defendant Landes1 Motion to Strike and heard 
argument concerning it. After full argument on the pending 
motions, the Court requested further briefing. Thereafter, 
post-hearing memoranda, letters and Court opinions were submitted 
to the Court. Based on the Court's careful consideration of all 
such submissions and good cause appearing: 
NOV 11 uS3 
^^azz& 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Defendant Landes1 Motion to Strike is denied; 
2. Defendant Landes' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; 
3. Plaintiff Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment is hereby granted; 
4. Defendant Landes is hereby barred from asserting at 
trial any defenses or counterclaims he asserted or could have 
asserted in Case No. C84-4355. This Court hereby rules that 
Defendant Landes is a guarantor of the obligations of Bagel Nosh 
Holding Corp. under the December 29, 1978 Lease Agreement 
covering the subject premises in the Olympus Hills Shopping 
Center located at 3923 Wasatch Boulevard, Holladay, Utah. The 
trial in this case shall be limited to the question of the amount 
of Defendant Landes' liability for rent and other charges 
accruing under the Bagel Nosh Lease. 
Dated this / u day of &±U*te±z£, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
John \A. Rokich, Distribt Court Judge 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorney for Defendant, Landes 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
On the 17th day of October, 1988, I caused to be hand 
delivered a true and accurate copy of the foregoing to: 
Daniel W. Jackson 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER, 




SIDNEY SEFTEL and MIKE LANDES, 
aka MICHAEL S. LANDES, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-85-7821 
Defendants Michael Landes' Motion for Summary Judgment was 
heard by the Court on the /J7 day of ^Lpk>* *>&,,' , 1988. The 
Court heard oral argument, reviewed the Memoranda filed and took 
the matter under advisement. Subsequent to taking the matter 
under advisement counsel submitted supplemental Memoranda and 
pertinent cases for the Court's review. The Court having read 
the supplemental Memoranda and the pertinent cases cited, met 
with counsel in chambers and advised counsel of its oral ruling 
denying defendant Landes1 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court 
advised counsel that it would prepare a brief written memorandum 
decision. 
The issue presented to the Court in this case is: 
OLYMPUS V, SEFTEL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Did a Judgment entered in a prior action between these 
parties bar defendant Landes from contesting liability in this 
action as a guarantor because the doctrine of res ajudicata or 
collateral estoppel applied. 
It is defendant Landes1 contention that res ajudicata nor 
collateral estoppel is applicable because a final judgment was 
not entered in a prior action against Bagel Nosh are of the other 
defendants in the prior case. However, notwithstanding, 
defendant Landes1 claim that the Judgment was not final for 
appeal purposes proceeded to satisfy the Judgment entered against 
defendant Landes. 
The Court can not envision any greater finality of a 
Judgment than a party foregoing its right to appeal pursuant to 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and paying the Judgment in 
full. When defendant Landes satisfied the Judgment, he gave up 
his right to appeal and the satisfaction of the Judgment in the 
prior action now precludes defendant Landes from asserting 
defenses to this action because the defenses are barred by the 
doctrine of res adjudicata and collateral estoppel. 
OLYMPUS V. SEFTEL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs' Memoranda and post hearing Memoranda are adopted 
by this Court in support of its ruling and refers counsel to said 
Memorandum for the reasons for the Court's ruling. 
Dated this , ^  O day of January, 1989. 
-^Jr
 0-jC A/' -J^^HLC^J1^ 
JOHN, A. ROKICH 
D'ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
OLYMPUS V. SEFTEL PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this -^ - day of January, 1989: 
Douglas G. Mortensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorney for Defendants 
175 S. Main, Suite 560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^^•^l'^H'C^Z>c 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
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• Default of Pltf/Deft Entered 







^i. 7^. ]^*e-w 
v/ 
i^  L ^ i ^ -/ / 
ORDERS: 
D Custody Evaluation Ordered 
• Visitation Rights 
• Custody Awarded To 
• Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
D Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
• Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office: 
= Per Month 
Per Month/Year • Alimony Waived 
• Atty. fees to the. 
• Home To: 
in the amount of • Deferred 
• Furnishings To: 
13 Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
3 Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
3 Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
3 Restraining Order Entered Against. 
. Automobile To: 
3 Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $. 
3 90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
"2 Divorce Granted To As 
j Decree To Become Final: • Upon Entry 
3 Former Name of 
• 3-Month Interlocutory 
. Is Restored 
3 Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft 
Returnable . Bail. 
3 Based on written stipulation of respective counselfrnotion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, court orders 
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